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ABSTRACT—For more than sixty years, prominent policing scholars have 
argued that the way to address the many problems of policing is to treat 
police departments like all other agencies of government—and to require that 
they set policy through something like notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
This paper argues that despite its intuitive appeal, rulemaking is not a 
particularly apt solution to policing’s various ills. Although policing scholars 
have been right to look to administrative law for ideas on how to govern 
policing, they have been focused on the wrong set of administrative tools. 
Instead of looking to the public to regulate the police through rulemaking, a 
more promising alternative is to create what I call regulatory 
intermediaries—permanent administrative bodies that can stand in for the 
public and help regulate the police. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A police department “is in every sense of the term an administrative 
agency.”1 Like any other agency, it “makes important policy,” and like any 
other agency, it should be required to formulate this policy “through rule-
making procedure along the line of what is required of federal agencies by 
the Administrative Procedure Act.”2 
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis made this observation in 1969, during 
what might be described as policing’s first “rulemaking moment.” Beginning 
in the mid-1960s, a number of scholars, including Professors Herman 
Goldstein and Anthony Amsterdam, embraced the idea that policing 
agencies are agencies like any other—and that like agencies, they should 
formulate policy through binding rules, with some opportunity for public 
comment.3 Rulemaking, they argued, would address many of the problems 
with policing that had drawn public scrutiny, from discriminatory 
 
 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 80 (1969). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 421–
22 (1974) (emphasizing benefits of public rulemaking by the police); Gerald M. Caplan, The Case for 
Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 500, 502–06 (1971) (same); 
Herman Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police Performance, 65 MICH. 
L. REV. 1123, 1130 (1967) (arguing that police rulemaking would enhance the operations and 
professionalization of individual policing agencies as well as the functionality of the broader criminal 
justice system); Robert M. Igleburger & Frank A. Schubert, Policy Making for the Police, 58 AM. B. 
ASS’N J. 307, 310 (1972) (advocating in favor of police rulemaking); Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and 
the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659, 676–81 (1972) (same). 
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enforcement to excessive force.4 Two national commissions echoed these 
observations,5 as did the American Bar Association and the American Law 
Institute, both of which launched projects to develop model rules for the 
police.6 
Although the first rulemaking moment largely fizzled by the 1980s—
due in no small part to the reluctance of policing agencies to conceive of 
themselves as rulemaking bodies—the idea that policing agencies should 
operate more like traditional administrative agencies has continued to hold 
sway. Over the years, prominent policing scholars, including Professors 
Samuel Walker, Wayne LaFave, Eric Luna, and Debra Livingston, have all 
argued in favor of using administrative rulemaking procedures to guide 
officer discretion.7 “[L]aw enforcement,” wrote Professor Luna, “has much 
to learn from the successes and failures of modern administrative law.”8 
In recent years, enthusiasm for police rulemaking—or a facsimile—has 
only grown. Professor Christopher Slobogin has argued forcefully in favor 
of subjecting “law enforcement [to] the rigors of administrative regulation.”9 
In Democratic Policing, Barry Friedman and I insisted that it was 
“fundamentally unacceptable for policing to remain aloof from the ordinary 
 
 4 Goldstein, supra note 3, at 1126–28; KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 98–120 (1975). 
 5 NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 162–65 (1968); PRESIDENT’S COMM’N 
ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 103–06 (1967). 
 6 AM. BAR ASS’N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE 
URBAN POLICE FUNCTION 116–43 (1973); AM. LAW INST., A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT 
PROCEDURE (1975). State-level projects also took root in a variety of states. See, e.g., PROJECT ON LAW 
ENF’T POLICY & RULEMAKING, ARIZ. STATE UNIV. & POLICE FOUND., MODEL RULES FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT: RELEASE OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS (1973); TEX. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COUNCIL, MODEL RULES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS: A MANUAL ON POLICE DISCRETION 
(1974); FRED A. WILEMAN, UNIV. OF WIS. INST. OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, MODEL POLICY MANUAL 
FOR POLICE AGENCIES (1976). 
 7 See Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, 
and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442, 449–
451 (1990) (arguing that courts should do more to encourage police rulemaking and highlighting the 
benefits of doing so); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: 
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 658–63 (1997) (suggesting 
rulemaking as one way to cabin discretion and enhance community-police reciprocity); Erik Luna, 
Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 594–608 (2000) (arguing in favor 
of rulemaking to cabin enforcement discretion); Samuel Walker, Controlling the Cops: A Legislative 
Approach to Police Rulemaking, 63 U. DET. L. REV. 361, 382–91 (1986) (arguing for legislatively-
mandated police rulemaking). See generally Gregory Howard Williams, Police Rulemaking Revisited: 
Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (1984) (arguing that police have 
the authority to engage in rulemaking and should do so to enhance uniformity in arrest decisions). 
 8 Luna, supra note 7, at 592. 
 9 Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 1771 (2014); see also Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 
165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 134–40 (2016) (arguing that police must engage in notice-and-comment 
rulemaking when implementing suspicionless search and seizure regimes). 
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processes of democratic governance”—by which we likewise meant the 
familiar processes of legislative authorization and public rulemaking used 
throughout the administrative state.10 Many others have argued in favor of 
giving “local communities . . . a more meaningful voice in evaluating and 
checking local police policy” through rulemaking, informal consultation, or 
even local city council approval.11 Nationally, a number of prominent 
organizations have called for greater public involvement in police 
decisionmaking, as has (yet another) presidential commission.12 We are, in 
short, in the midst of a rulemaking renaissance. 
 
 10 Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1827 
(2015). 
 11 Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discretion, 58 HOW. L.J. 521, 525 (2015); see also ANDREW 
GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 188–201 (2017) (arguing for surveillance summits as one way to bring public 
accountability to police policymaking); Richard A. Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the 
Constitutional Law of Punishment, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1453 (2017) (arguing in favor of 
“[s]ubjecting wholesale police, prosecutorial, and sentencing policies to some variant of a notice-and-
comment process”); Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 
97 MINN. L. REV. 1, 36 (2012) (same); Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 
91 WASH. L. REV. 1595, 1656 (2016) (arguing that police departments should get local approval before 
accepting surveillance technologies through federal grant programs); Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic 
Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement” Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 793, 816–17 (2016) (highlighting community engagement provisions in DOJ consent 
decrees as a means by which police agencies can be democratized); Kami Chavis Simmons, New 
Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police 
Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 379 (2010) (advocating for a “bottom-up approach” to police policy-
making that allows for “stakeholder engagement and local experimentation”); Christopher Slobogin, 
Community Control Over Camera Surveillance: A Response to Bennett Capers’s Crime, Surveillance, 
and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 993, 997 (2013) (arguing for legislative authorization of police 
surveillance “by a truly representative body,” such as a neighborhood council); Jonathan M. Smith, 
Closing the Gap Between What is Lawful and What is Right in Police Use of Force Jurisprudence by 
Making Police Departments More Democratic Institutions, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 315, 336 (2016) 
(calling for democratization of policing, including the policy formulation process). There also has been a 
broader push to democratize criminal justice policymaking more generally. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, 
Criminal Justice That Revives Republican Democracy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1507, 1519–22 (2017) 
(arguing for democratizing criminal justice through restorative justice); Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of 
Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367, 1378 (2017) (advocating a range of reforms to 
“democratize criminal justice”). 
 12 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S 
TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 19 (2015); see also INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, IACP 
NATIONAL POLICY SUMMIT ON COMMUNITY-POLICE RELATIONS: ADVANCING A CULTURE OF COHESION 
AND COMMUNITY TRUST 16 (2015) (urging agencies to pursue “true partnership” which involves 
“institutionalized inclusion of citizens in the business of the police department”); JUSTICE 
COLLABORATORY, YALE LAW SCH., PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURALLY JUST POLICING 14–15 (2018) 
(“When writing policies, departments should seek community input through one or more structured 
processes that provide community members with meaningful opportunities to be heard.”); POLICING 
PROJECT, N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON DEMOCRATIC POLICING (2017) (urging, 
in a statement signed on to by several major law enforcement and civil liberties organizations, that 
“policing practices should be guided by rules . . . [that] are formulated with input from the public”), 
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And yet, there are serious reasons to doubt whether rulemaking—either 
along the lines of the federal model or the proposed alternatives—is in fact 
a viable strategy for governing the police. As often is true, the devil is in the 
details. But despite more than five decades of scholarship devoted to making 
the case for police rulemaking, there has been very little attention paid to 
how rulemaking would actually work in practice. A closer look makes clear 
that despite its intuitive appeal, administrative rulemaking is not a 
particularly apt solution to policing’s various ills. 
The reason for this is simple, if often overlooked: Although policing 
agencies are agencies, they are fundamentally different from the sorts of 
agencies in which rulemaking predominates. Elsewhere in government, 
notice-and-comment rulemaking is used primarily to ensure that agencies 
regulate us sensibly.13 Agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency 
(or the local board of public health) rely on rules to tell the public what to 
do. They use rules, for example, to set emissions standards or to instruct 
manufacturers on how to handle certain foods safely.14 The Administrative 
Procedure Act’s (APA’s) notice-and-comment requirements, in turn, require 
agencies to obtain public input before these sorts of outward facing (or 
“legislative”) rules go into effect.15 
Policing agencies do not—and may not—use rules in the same way. 
The police are not authorized to regulate the public through rules.16 When 
scholars argue in favor of police rulemaking, the sorts of rules they have in 
mind are rules that tell officers what they can and cannot do in enforcing the 





 13 Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), for example, agencies are only required to get 
public input on so-called legislative rules—that is, rules that tell the public what to do or alter the public’s 
rights or obligations in some way. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012) (exempting “interpretative rules, 
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice” from rulemaking 
requirements). 
 14 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 86.1811-04 (2005) (setting emission standards for light-duty vehicles, light-
duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles); 9 C.F.R. § 416.4 (1999) (“All food-contact 
surfaces . . . must be cleaned and sanitized as frequently as necessary to prevent the creation of insanitary 
conditions and the adulteration of product.”). 
 15 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (defining the rulemaking process). The APA’s notice-and-comment 
procedure requires “informing the public of [the agency’s] proposed rules, soliciting comment on those 
proposals, and responding in a reasoned way to significant objections to the agency’s proposed course of 
action.” M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1390 
(2004). 
 16 Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1857. 
 17 See infra note 57 (describing the sorts of practices that scholars have argued should be regulated 
through public rulemaking). 
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As this Article explains, the difference between the legislative rules that 
typically are subject to administrative rulemaking requirements and the 
internal rules that policing agencies adopt has several implications for the 
viability of APA-style rulemaking in the policing space. First, policing 
agencies have far fewer incentives than traditional administrative agencies 
to adopt rules.18 And without rules, there is nothing on which the public can 
comment. Although legislatures could require policing agencies to issue 
rules, these sorts of requirements would be difficult both to articulate and to 
enforce, particularly when it comes to policing practices that are of greatest 
concern.19 It also is much harder in the policing context to specify when 
policing agencies would need to obtain public input on the rules they do in 
fact have.20 Finally, because police rules regulate internal systems—the 
workings of which commonly are hidden from public view—it often is more 
difficult for the public to provide input on the substance of those rules.21 
This last point has implications not only for the feasibility of APA-style 
rulemaking requirements but also for the broader push to “democratize” 
policing by creating opportunities for the public to participate in police 
decisionmaking. The tendency across much of this literature has been to 
reduce police policymaking to a series of “referendum-style” questions, such 
as whether to get body-worn cameras, or whether officers should be required 
to “deescalate” potentially violent encounters.22 Framed in this manner, it is 
easy to imagine members of the public having strong views and those views 
potentially influencing what the police do. In practice, however, many of the 
problems that people have identified with policing are the product of 
elaborate systems, comprised of many overlapping policies and practices.23 
It simply is not realistic to think that the public can meaningfully address 
systemic shortfalls by providing periodic comment on some of the more 
salient aspects of police department rules. 
For all of these reasons, this Article argues that to improve policing 
outcomes, scholars and reformers should look beyond rulemaking and 
consider other important features of agency design.24 Within administrative 
law, a great deal of work has been done to assess the degree to which various 
institutional design choices can facilitate or impede agency function and 
 
 18 See infra Section II.A. 
 19 See infra Section II.B. 
 20 See infra Section II.C. 
 21 See infra Section II.D. 
 22 See infra notes 190–194 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra Part III. 
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political control.25 Although a small number of scholars have begun to apply 
some of these insights to other criminal justice agencies—including 
prosecutors’ offices, sentencing commissions, and national intelligence 
agencies—very little work has been done around policing, which presents a 
different set of regulatory challenges.26 
This Article begins to fill this gap. Part I briefly describes some of the 
problems with policing that have drawn public scrutiny—all of which 
policing scholars have argued could be improved through administrative 
rulemaking. It also summarizes some of the conventional arguments that 
others have made about the limits of rulemaking, which, although important, 
have done little to undermine the core case in favor of extending APA-style 
rulemaking to the police. Part II makes clear that the problems with 
rulemaking run quite a bit deeper than scholars have recognized. It argues 
that although some areas of policing, particularly the use of surveillance 
technologies, fit comfortably within the rulemaking paradigm, others, like 
the use of force or the exercise of enforcement discretion, largely do not. Part 
III suggests that a more promising alternative to rulemaking is to create 
“regulatory intermediaries”—entities within government, such as 
commissions or inspectors general, which can stand in for the public and 
help govern the police. It also points out that given some of the obstacles to 
governing policing locally, it may be worth considering to what extent police 
decisions should be made locally at all. 
 
 25 Institutional design refers to how an organization is structured to operate, and these deliberate 
choices can include extent of authority, leadership model, and relative placement in a bureaucratic 
reporting structure. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in 
Administrative Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2008) (exploring the effect of agency structure on the 
degree to which agencies incorporate privacy concerns into their decisionmaking); Rachel E. Barkow, 
Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129 (2016) (analyzing the ways in which 
agency design can impede or promote public oversight of agency enforcement discretion); Christopher 
R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, Essay, Agency Design and Political Control, 126 YALE L.J. 1002 (2017) 
(assessing the effect of budgeting decisions on agency design); Patrick M. Corrigan & Richard L. Revesz, 
The Genesis of Independent Agencies, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637 (2017) (analyzing what factors make 
agencies more likely to be independent); Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street: The 
New Administrative Process, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 689 (2013) (discussing the use of various agency design 
and oversight structures in shaping recent financial regulatory reforms); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal 
Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch From Within, Essay, 115 YALE L.J. 
2314 (2006) (proposing reforms of internal separation of powers within the executive branch); Gillian E. 
Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 
59 EMORY L.J. 423 (2009) (same). 
 26 See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715 (2005) (sentencing 
commissions); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009) (prosecutors’ offices); Samuel J. Rascoff, 
Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 575 (2010) (domestic intelligence programs); Daphna 
Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039 (2016) 
(programmatic surveillance); Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in 
Federal Agencies, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 53 (2014) (Offices of Goodness). 
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To be clear at the outset, the goal of this Article is not to question the 
utility of encouraging policing agencies to open up their decisionmaking 
processes to greater public scrutiny. Given the lack of transparency around 
policing, and the substantial legitimacy deficit in many communities, efforts 
to make policing more open and collaborative are a step in the right direction. 
The question this Article tackles is whether public rulemaking alone is a 
viable strategy for governing policing—that is, for getting policing agencies 
to do things that they might not otherwise be inclined to do. At the end of the 
day, it argues that law enforcement may indeed have “much to learn from 
the successes and failures of modern administrative law”27—but that the 
lessons lie beyond the notice-and-comment provisions of the APA. 
I. RULEMAKING’S ALLURE 
Over the years, commentators and scholars have pointed to a variety of 
problems with policing, from excessive force to discriminatory enforcement 
to the persistent creep of the surveillance state. And they have pointed to 
administrative rulemaking as a possible solution. This Part begins by briefly 
describing some of the problems with policing that have drawn the most 
attention. It then explains rulemaking’s enduring appeal. It concludes by 
summarizing the conventional objections that others have raised about the 
limits of police rulemaking, none of which really address the core of why 
APA-style rulemaking is not a particularly apt solution to policing’s ills. 
A. The Problems with Policing 
By far the most salient issue around policing has been the use of 
excessive force—particularly in communities of color. Complaints about 
police violence have plagued policing for decades.28 Many can recall the 
high-profile incidents that have occasionally brought the problem to the 
fore—from the beating of Rodney King to the more recent killings of 
Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Tamir Rice.29 As Obama-era Justice 
Department investigations in cities like Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, 
Miami, Newark, New Orleans, and Seattle made clear, these events are not 
isolated incidents.30 In far too many jurisdictions, officers are too quick to 
 
 27 Luna, supra note 7, at 592. 
 28 See, e.g., James Baldwin, A Report from Occupied Territory, NATION (July 11, 1966) (describing 
routine police abuses in 1960s Harlem). 
 29 Smith, supra note 11, at 315, 334–39. 
 30 Each of these reports found that the city police department “engage[d] in a pattern or practice 
of . . . using excessive force.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE 
BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (2016) [hereinafter BALTIMORE DOJ REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. ATT’Y’S OFFICE, N. DIST. OF ILL., INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 11 (2017) [hereinafter CHICAGO DOJ REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL 
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pull the trigger in circumstances that do not warrant the use of deadly force.31 
And they too often resort to force as punishment for talking back or 
attempting to flee.32 Equally troubling is the fact that officers rarely are held 
accountable for doing so. The Justice Department’s various investigations 
confirmed what communities long suspected: that use of force incidents 
often go unreported, and that when they are, investigations are stacked 
heavily in favor of the police.33 
Another recurring complaint has been around the use of stop and frisk 
and other intrusive street-level enforcement tactics. Bound up in the critiques 
of stop and frisk are four distinct complaints: that officers make far too many 
stops; that stops often are plainly unconstitutional; that people of color are 
disproportionately likely to be stopped; and that stops sometimes are 
conducted in a harsh and disrespectful manner.34 In New York City, for 
example, the NYPD conducted more than 4.4 million stops between 2004 
 
RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE 3 (2014) [hereinafter CLEVELAND 
DOJ REPORT]; Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., to the Hon. Tomas P. Regalado, 
Mayor, City of Miami & Chief Manuel Orosa, City of Miami Police Dep’t, Investigation of the City of 
Miami Police Department (July 9, 2013) [hereinafter MIAMI DOJ REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL 
RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. ATT’Y’S OFFICE, DIST. OF N.J., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEWARK POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 22 (2014) [hereinafter NEWARK DOJ REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., 
INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 (2011) [hereinafter NEW ORLEANS DOJ 
REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. ATT’Y’S OFFICE, W. DIST. OF WASH., 
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (2011) [hereinafter SEATTLE DOJ REPORT]. 
 31 See, e.g., CHICAGO DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 25–26; CLEVELAND DOJ REPORT, supra note 
30, at 14–18; NEW ORLEANS DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 8–9. 
 32 See, e.g., BALTIMORE DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 88 (noting the use of baton strikes by BPD 
officers as punishment for failure to heed an order); CHICAGO DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 33–34 
(highlighting CPD use of “retaliatory force” against individuals who dispute the lawfulness of their police 
stops); NEWARK DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 24 (noting that many cases where NPD officers struck 
suspects with their fists appeared to be retaliatory); SEATTLE DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 14 (finding 
that SPD engages in a pattern or practice of using unreasonable force against individuals who “talk back”). 
 33 See, e.g., BALTIMORE DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 10 (noting that BPD conducts minimal or 
no investigation of reported officer misconduct); CLEVELAND DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 5 (“[DOJ] 
reviewed supervisory investigations of [CDP] officers’ use of force that appear to be designed from the 
outset to justify the officers’ actions.”); MIAMI DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 9 (finding that MPD 
“fail[s] to timely and thoroughly investigate officer-involved shootings”); NEW ORLEANS DOJ REPORT, 
supra note 30, at 14 (finding significant underreporting of force by NOPD officers). 
 34 See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, STOP AND FRISK: THE HUMAN IMPACT 1 (2012), 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/the-human-impact-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TB8A-J8MG] (exploring these issues in interviews with New Yorkers who were 
stopped and frisked and experienced “illegal profiling, improper arrests, inappropriate touching, sexual 
harassment, humiliation and violence at the hands of police officers”); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. 
Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (addressing constitutionality and disproportionate racial impact of stops); 
Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban 
Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2398 (2017) (noting the frequency of stops in some neighborhoods). 
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and 2012.35 The vast majority of those stopped were black or Hispanic.36 And 
the vast majority were innocent of any wrongdoing.37 Yet they were stopped, 
questioned, and often searched.38 In an unknown (and unknowable) number 
of cases, they were threatened with force, or subjected to racial slurs, or 
otherwise treated with contempt.39 “[F]or many urban residents,” writes 
Professor Aziz Huq, these encounters “likely became the modal form of 
police-citizen contact.”40 The costs of these encounters have been well-
documented, and are undoubtedly substantial.41 
Still others, particularly in recent years, have focused attention on the 
unrelenting creep of the surveillance state. Policing agencies have at their 
disposal a growing array of surveillance tools—including drones, CCTV 
cameras, license plate readers, and social media monitoring tools—with still 
more pervasive surveillance capabilities, like real-time facial recognition, 
possibly right around the corner.42 For some, the concern has been about the 
 
 35 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). In some Baltimore 
neighborhoods, officers recorded nearly 1.5 stops per resident per year which, given systemic 
underreporting, meant that they likely conducted a great deal more. BALTIMORE DOJ REPORT, supra note 
30, at 26. 
 36 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 556. 
 37 In New York, fewer than 12% of stops resulted in a summons or an arrest, and fewer than 0.2% 
produced a firearm. N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP & FRISK DURING THE BLOOMBERG 
ADMINISTRATION (2002–2013) 14–16 (2014). 
 38 In New York, officers frisked over 50% of those stopped. Id. at 7. The term “frisk” is a poor 
euphemism for the intrusion that a pat down entails. See DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE: 
HOW OUR SEARCH FOR SAFETY INVADES OUR LIBERTIES 40 (2011) (quoting a Washington, D.C. police 
instructor telling recruits to “Put your fingers between the belt and the waistband. He may say, ‘I’m 
sensitive down there.’ Well, aren’t we all.”). 
 39 See, e.g., JENNIFER FRATELLO ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, COMING OF AGE WITH STOP AND 
FRISK: EXPERIENCES, PERCEPTIONS, AND PUBLIC SAFETY IMPLICATIONS 30 (2013) (nearly half of the 
respondents reported that they were threatened or experienced force); Ross Tuttle & Erin Schneider, 
Stopped-and-Frisked: ‘For Being a F*cking Mutt’, NATION (Oct. 8, 2012), https://www.thenation.com
/article/stopped-and-frisked-being-fking-mutt-video [https://perma.cc/DJ3F-WW34] (describing a 
recording showing an officer using a racial slur in an encounter with a minor). 
 40 Huq, supra note 34, at 2398. 
 41 See id. at 2429–40 (arguing that there are eight distinctive “ecological and dynamic costs” of stop 
and frisk); Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban Men, 
104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2323–24 (2014) (finding that individuals stopped and frisked by police 
report more symptoms of anxiety and trauma); Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs 
of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 901–04 (2015). 
 42 See, e.g., FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 86–90 (describing the various technologies and data sources 
that agencies have at their disposal); Cynthia Lum et al., The Rapid Diffusion of License Plate Readers 
in U.S. Law Enforcement Agencies, 42 POLICING: INT’L J. 376, 386 (2019) (estimating that between 66% 
and 73% of agencies with 100 officers or more would have access to ALPRs by 2016); Conor 
Friedersdorf, The Surveillance City of Camden, New Jersey, ATLANTIC (Dec. 12, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/12/the-surveillance-city-of-camden-new-
jersey/282286 [https://perma.cc/8NBS-TF7H] (discussing the Camden police “force multipliers,” which 
include 121 sidewalk cameras, 35 microphones to detect the location of gunfire, a SkyPatrol crane that 
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sheer ubiquity of surveillance and the threat that it poses to individual 
privacy and free expression and association.43 For others, the fear is that these 
new technologies will further exacerbate existing racial disparities 
throughout the criminal justice system.44 A third risk, related to the other two, 
is that policing technologies can easily be abused.45 Agencies can use the 
technologies intentionally to target individuals on the basis of religion, 
political affiliation, or race.46 Individual officers can misuse the tools for 
private gain, for example, by using a license plate database to track a 
wayward spouse.47 
Finally, at least since the 1960s, one of the predominant concerns with 
policing—if not the central concern—has been with police discretion.48 It 
often is said that policing is “shot through with discretion.”49 Officers decide 
where to patrol and whom to stop, whether to issue a warning for a broken 
taillight or write a ticket, and whether to throw a joint in the gutter, issue a 
summons, or make an arrest. Commanders decide whether to prioritize the 
rash of commercial burglaries or to try to do something about the dealers on 
the corner. 
 
can monitor six square blocks, and a fleet of cruisers equipped with ALPRs); Timothy Williams,  
Can 30,000 Cameras Help Solve Chicago’s Crime Problem?, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2018), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2018/05/26/us/chicago-police-surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/FY9G-BP6X]. In 
2018, several body camera manufacturers announced plans to outfit cameras with real-time facial 
recognition technology, which could scan people’s faces as they pass by and alert officers if there is a 
potential match to a suspect database or heat list. Shibani Mahtani & Zusha Elinson, Artificial Intelligence 
Could Soon Enhance Real-Time Police Surveillance, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/artificial-intelligence-could-soon-enhance-real-time-police-surveillance-
1522761813 [https://perma.cc/NR3R-PUC2]. Some jurisdictions already use facial recognition 
technology to scan faces at entry points to major sporting events and have explored adding real-time facial 
recognition capability to CCTV cameras as well. CLARE GARVIĘ ET AL., GEO. LAW, CTR. ON PRIVACY & 
TECH., PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACE RECOGNITION IN AMERICA (2016), 
https://www.perpetuallineup.org [https://perma.cc/CBA6-AMKQ]. 
 43 See, e.g., Crump, supra note 11, at 1644; Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013); Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked 
World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 748 (2008). 
 44 Predictive policing algorithms that are trained on criminal justice data—which itself reflects 
decades of biased enforcement—could focus still more police attention on communities of color by 
marking certain individuals or neighborhoods as more prone to criminality than they in fact are. Andrew 
Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109, 1146–50 (2017). 
 45 Crump, supra note 11, at 1644–45. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See generally DAVIS, supra note 4; LaFave, supra note 7; Livingston, supra note 7; Erik Luna, 
Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000) (discussing concerns with discretion in the 
enforcement of criminal law); Miller, supra note 11, at 525. 
 49 See, e.g., David D. Cole, Formalism, Realism, and the War on Drugs, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 241, 
245 (2001); Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1860. 
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The problem, of course, is not so much with discretion itself, but with 
how that discretion is used. Too often, the failure to sufficiently cabin 
discretion has resulted in both over- and under-enforcement, typically at the 
expense of racial minorities and other marginalized groups.50 The statistics 
are all too familiar. African-Americans are nearly four times more likely to 
be arrested for marijuana possession than are whites, despite similar rates of 
use.51 Certain crimes like loitering or riding a bicycle on the sidewalk are far 
more likely to be enforced in poor black neighborhoods than in affluent white 
ones.52 At the same time, residents in low-income, minority neighborhoods 
have complained for decades about “unsolved homicides, permitted open-air 
drug markets, slow or nonexistent 911 responses, and tolerance of pervasive, 
low levels of violence.”53 Often, it is the very same residents who report 
feeling both underprotected and overpoliced.54 
Together, these four sets of problems—excessive force, stop and frisk, 
surveillance, and discretion—are emblematic of the different sorts of 
regulatory problems that policing presents. And for this reason, they are used 
throughout this Article to illustrate the inherent challenges in adapting APA-
style rulemaking to the policing space. In reality of course, there are any 
number of other practices that one could discuss. The events in Ferguson 
following the killing of Michael Brown drew attention to two other troubling 
facets of policing: policing for profit, as well as the militarization of local 
police.55 Many also have criticized the lack of controls around the use of 
informants, particularly juveniles, who often are needlessly put in harm’s 
 
 50 On the broader concerns with enforcement discretion and the potential it leaves for arbitrary or 
uneven enforcement, see DAVIS, supra note 4, at 98–120. 
 51 ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 12 (2013). 
 52 Between 2008 and 2011, New York City police issued more than two thousand summonses for 
riding a bicycle on a sidewalk in the predominantly black neighborhood of Bedford-Stuyvesant, but just 
eight such summonses in predominantly white (and affluent) Park Slope. Tobi Haslett, Broken Windows 
Comes to Park Slope, NEW YORKER (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/broken-windows-comes-to-park-slope [https://perma.cc/5ZNE-7GXQ]. 
 53 Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1723 (2006). 
 54 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 19 (1997); Monica C. Bell, Police Reform 
and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2069 (2017); Natapoff, supra note 53, 
at 1719 (“Over- and underenforcement are twin symptoms of a deeper democratic weakness of the 
criminal [justice] system: its non-responsiveness to the needs of the poor, racial minorities, and the 
otherwise politically vulnerable.”). 
 55 On militarization, see Shirley Li, The Evolution of Police Militarization in Ferguson and Beyond, 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/08/the-evolution-of-
police-militarization-in-ferguson-and-beyond/376107/ [https://perma.cc/U5FR-MCD3]; on policing for 
profit, see, for example, Jeffrey Fagan & Elliot Ash, New Policing, New Segregation: From Ferguson to 
New York, 106 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 33 (2014). 
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way.56 Policing, in short, presents a variety of problems that cry out for 
careful regulation. The question that this Article tackles is whether 
rulemaking is the right strategy for bringing them under control. 
B. The Enduring Appeal of Administrative Rulemaking 
Over the years, scholars have argued that many of the problems with 
policing could be addressed through administrative rulemaking—that is, by 
requiring policing agencies to articulate key policing decisions through 
written rules, with some opportunity for public input and debate.57 Many 
others have argued more broadly in favor of “democratizing” police 
decisionmaking around these practices.58 The theory behind these proposals 
is both intuitive and compelling. 
As rulemaking proponents point out, policing agencies operate very 
differently from other agencies of government. Federal, state, and local 
agencies issue thousands of pages of regulations each year—on matters large 
and small. And they routinely consult with the public in developing policies 
and rules on everything from nuclear regulation to the placement of turnstiles 
at a local subway station. Indeed, under the Federal APA and its state and 
local analogues, agencies are required to get public input and to respond to 
the substance of any comments received before agency rules may go into 
effect.59 
Police departments, by contrast, often lack policies on critical aspects 
of policing—such as the exercise of enforcement discretion. And to the 
 
 56 See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF 
AMERICAN JUSTICE (2009); Sarah Stillman, The Throwaways, NEW YORKER (Aug. 27, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/09/03/the-throwaways [https://perma.cc/BKZ8-LTV2]. 
 57 A number of scholars, including Professors Anthony Amsterdam, Herman Goldstein, Eric Miller, 
and Samuel Walker have called for police to use something akin to notice-and-comment rulemaking in 
developing policies around the use of force, as well as investigative tactics like stop and frisk. See 
Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 414–28; Goldstein, supra note 3, at 1126–28; Miller, supra note 11, at 545–
48; Walker, supra note 7, at 370–74. Professors Catherine Crump, Christopher Slobogin, and others have 
argued in favor of rulemaking to govern police use of surveillance technologies and other “panvasive” 
investigative tactics. See Crump, supra note 11, at 1658–62; Slobogin, supra note 11, at 996–97; 
Slobogin, Policing as Administration, supra note 9, at 137–40. Professors Kenneth Culp Davis, Debra 
Livingston, and Erik Luna all have pointed to rulemaking as a way to cabin enforcement discretion and 
to ensure that police exercise their discretion in a manner that reflects community views. See DAVIS, 
supra note 1, at 96; Livingston, supra note 7, at 658–63; Luna, supra note 7, at 603–05. And of course, 
Professor Barry Friedman and I argued that the public should have an opportunity to weigh in on all 
police policies that affect them—and pointed to notice-and-comment rulemaking as one model for how 
this might occur. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1843–48. 
 58 See Patel, supra note 11, at 871–77; Simmons, supra note 11, at 408–10; Smith, supra note 11, at 
336; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text (listing other scholars who have advocated for 
expanded opportunities for public input in police decisionmaking processes). 
 59 As discussed in Section II.A, infra, these requirements only apply to “legislative” rules. See infra 
notes 174–176 and accompanying text. 
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extent that there are department policies in place, they often are shielded 
from public view.60 Even when they are public, there is almost never any 
opportunity for the public to comment on the policies before they go into 
effect.61 
Yet, as the discussion above makes clear, policing agencies routinely 
make crucial policy determinations that can (and do) quite literally involve 
matters of life and death. The idea that these decisions should be insulated 
from public scrutiny—or worse still, made on a case-by-case basis by 
individual officers without the benefit of formal guidance—is inconsistent 
with fundamental democratic norms.62 As Professor Slobogin put it, a 
“regime that requires the relevant agency to submit to administrative law 
constraints” when adopting rules concerning “workplace ergonomics,” but 
“not when police want to require citizens to submit to . . . surveillance, is 
seriously askew.”63 
The connection between the lack of administrative processes around 
policing and the various policy shortfalls discussed above is readily apparent. 
One of the core goals of administrative rulemaking is to improve the quality 
of agency deliberations, and in doing so, to make policies better. When it 
comes to policing, particularly in the troubled departments that have drawn 
Justice Department scrutiny, there is no shortage of policy changes that could 
be made to improve outcomes at least to some degree. Justice Department 
consent decrees devote dozens of pages to specific policy changes that need 
to be made. In Baltimore, for example, the Justice Department found that the 
department’s use of force policies were “scattered across multiple 
documents” and were “missing critical elements.”64 And in Newark—where 
the Justice Department found that a staggering seventy-five percent of 
documented stops lacked reasonable suspicion—the department’s stop 
policy incorrectly implied that presence in a “high crime area” alone may be 
sufficient to justify a stop.65 Had these agencies subjected their policies to 
 
 60 Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1845–46. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1827 (arguing that “it is fundamentally 
unacceptable for policing to remain aloof from the ordinary processes of democratic governance”); 
Igleburger & Schubert, supra note 3, at 309 (arguing that the public “should determine police enforcement 
policy in a democratic society”); Miller, supra note 11, at 536–45 (arguing that police policymaking that 
is insulated from the community is inconsistent with republican norms); David Alan Sklansky, Police 
and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1819 (2005) (noting that police “often seem to operate outside 
the normal processes of local government”). 
 63 Slobogin, Policing as Administration, supra note 9, at 133–34. 
 64 BALTIMORE DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 98. 
 65 NEWARK DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 9–10 (noting that the department’s policies include 
“[h]igh crime areas and the type of activity that takes place there” and “[p]roximity to scene of a crime” 
as “reasonable suspicious factors to stop a person”). 
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notice-and-comment rulemaking, perhaps some of these changes would 
already have been in place. 
Public rulemaking also could help bring policies more into line with 
what community members expect. As Professor Goldstein argued in the 
1960s, for example, police department policies around stop and frisk (known 
at the time as “field interrogation”) as well as the enforcement of quality of 
life offenses would likely look quite different if departments were required 
to put their policies in writing and to consult with members of affected 
communities in their adoption.66 Professor Davis echoed similar themes, 
noting that many enforcement practices were “illegal or of doubtful legality” 
and would never have been sanctioned had police officials been required to 
adopt them through public rules.67 More recently, scholars have pointed to a 
number of examples of police department policies—on issues ranging from 
the use of surveillance technology to racial profiling—changing in response 
to greater public scrutiny and debate.68 And it is easy to see why: acting on 
his own, a police chief may jump at the chance to get the shiny new 
surveillance tool. If required to justify its use to the public, however, the chief 
may come to see that its vague benefits simply do not outweigh the steep 
privacy costs. 
The core insight behind all of these arguments is that the problem of 
policing is, fundamentally, a problem of governance. By insulating policing 
agencies from the ordinary processes of administrative government, we have 
essentially left policing agencies to regulate themselves, with predictably 
troubling effects. 
C. The Conventional Case Against Police Rulemaking 
No one has argued, of course, that police rulemaking would be a 
panacea—or that it would easily be accomplished. Indeed, rulemaking 
proponents themselves have pointed to a variety of obstacles that their 
proposals would face. But if anything, these obstacles have only served to 
strengthen their resolve. Specifically, they and others have raised three 
important objections: the inherent limits of rules, the undemocratic character 
of administrative rulemaking, and the resource constraints that policing 
agencies face. But as this Section makes clear, there are fairly obvious 
 
 66 Goldstein, supra note 3, at 1140. The phrase “quality of life offenses” is used to describe a variety 
of low-level offenses, including loitering, littering, excessive noise, and public intoxication. 
 67 Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEX. L. REV. 703, 703–04, 
716–17 (1974). 
 68 See Crump, supra note 11, at 1604–28 (describing public backlash after residents became aware 
of surveillance practices in both Seattle and Oakland); Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1853 
(describing similar backlash in Seattle and elsewhere). 
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rejoinders to each. As a result, proponents have been able to argue that 
although rulemaking would be difficult to implement, the case in its favor 
nevertheless is fundamentally sound. 
1. The Difficulty of Writing and Enforcing Rules for the Police 
A common critique of police rulemaking has focused on the limitations 
of rules themselves. The argument is that rules will be quite difficult to write 
for certain areas of policing. When it comes to discretionary enforcement 
decisions, for example, it may not always be possible to construct a rule that 
captures the nuance of any given situation that an officer may face.69 
Although agencies can provide guidance to officers on deciding when to 
issue a warning or make an arrest, many of the factors that legitimately could 
inform that decision—such as the degree to which a person is being 
disruptive to others or the likelihood that a warning will deter future 
conduct—are difficult to reduce to hard and fast rules.70 
A related objection is that published rules and guidelines may not 
always be desirable. Professor Rachel Barkow points to two sets of 
concerns.71 First, although enforcement guidelines promote transparency and 
regularity, these gains may come at the expense of deterrence, particularly 
when guidelines are used to announce that certain laws will not be prioritized 
or will simply go unenforced.72 Agencies, writes Professor Barkow, may 
want “to deter conduct across a range of cases even if [their] limited 
resources may not make those cases a priority.”73 A second concern is that 
given the politics around crime and criminal justice, making enforcement 
policies more transparent may result in policies that on the whole are harsher 
than what the agency might otherwise be inclined to pursue.74 
Finally, it often is difficult to ensure that the rules will in fact be 
followed. Much has been written about police as the quintessential “street-
level bureaucrats” who exercise vast stores of discretion, much of which is 
largely invisible to supervisors.75 Although certain enforcement decisions, 
like citations and arrests, generate a paper trail, many of the decisions that 
officers make do not. Unless an officer reports an encounter or a member of 
 
 69 See Livingston, supra note 7, at 662–63. 
 70 See DAVIS, supra note 4, at 151. Professor Debra Livingston also points out that if agencies adopt 
overly rigid rules, they risk having the rules ignored. Livingston, supra note 7, at 662–63. 
 71 See Barkow, supra note 25, at 1154–59. 
 72 Id. at 1158. In certain contexts, of course, this may not matter, or may in fact be the goal. The 
Obama administration’s immigration enforcement guidelines, for example, were designed to help 
undocumented immigrants feel more secure. Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. (raising this concern in the context of prosecutors). 
 75 MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC 
SERVICES 3 (30th Anniversary ed. rev. 2010); see also Livingston, supra note 7, at 662. 
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the public lodges a complaint, a supervisor may have no way of knowing 
whether an officer approached a person on the street, conducted a stop or a 
frisk, told a group of young people to “move along,” ordered a panhandler 
off a bus stop, treated someone abrasively, or used excessive force. 
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that noncompliance sometimes 
has been tolerated or even encouraged, either by mid-level supervisors or 
department command. Supervisors have been known to accept deficient 
reports, ignore serious allegations of misconduct, and even encourage 
officers to violate department rules.76 And they may be particularly reluctant 
to enforce policies that they perceive to have been foisted on the department 
by outsiders.77 This last point is particularly troubling if the goal of 
rulemaking is to push policing policy in directions a department would not 
adopt on its own. Unless department supervisors buy in to the proposed 
policies (or are incentivized to do so through external monitoring or political 
controls), even the most stringent rules may only accomplish so much. 
As rulemaking proponents point out, however, these objections—
although important—are at best a cautionary tale about the outer limits of 
rules. The reality is that at present, policing agencies are nowhere close to 
the point at which one might start to wonder whether there cannot be more 
and better rules to write that could improve things at least to some degree. In 
many departments, for example, use of force policies simply instruct officers 
to use whatever force is “reasonable” to address the situation at issue.78 There 
is no question that these departments can and must provide more guidance 
to their officers about when force may be used. Where rules are not feasible, 
agencies still can develop guidelines, strategic plans, and performance 
benchmarks to guide agency action and make policy choices more 
transparent to the public.79 Although it may be difficult to ensure perfect 
 
 76 See, e.g., BALTIMORE DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 29 (describing multiple Baltimore police 
sergeants who were observed encouraging patrol officers to make illegal stops); CLEVELAND DOJ 
REPORT, supra note 30, at 6, 11–12 (finding that police supervisors “routinely approved . . . inadequate 
reports without seeking additional information from the officers”); NEWARK DOJ REPORT, supra note 
30, at 25–27 (documenting Newark Police Department’s inadequate reporting and review systems). 
 77 See, e.g., CHICAGO DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 102 (describing CPD’s haphazard effort to roll 
out a new pedestrian stop reporting policy, which was mandated by a settlement with the ACLU). 
 78 See Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211, 278 
(2017) (noting that many use of force policies “say very little at all beyond a constitutional floor of 
‘reasonableness’”). 
 79 Recruitment and training, for example, are two areas that would seem to be difficult to reduce to 
rules. And yet, as part of the consent decree process in Cleveland, the Division of Police has prepared 
detailed staffing and recruitment plans, which establish minimum staffing levels for various units, and 
describe the concrete steps that the department plans to take to recruit a more diverse workforce. See 
MICHAEL BUTLER, CLEVELAND DIV. OF POLICE, CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE STAFFING REPORT 
(2017), http://www.city.cleveland.oh.us/sites/default/files/forms_publications/PublicStaffingPlan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3VDT-QLAA]; CITY OF CLEVELAND, CITY OF CLEVELAND SAFETY FORCES FIVE-
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compliance, few would argue that it is in fact preferable to have no rules at 
all. 
2. The Undemocratic Character of Administrative Rulemaking 
Another frequent criticism has been that rulemaking is not democratic 
enough.80 Some scholars have pointed out that regimented rulemaking 
procedures do not allow for much of a back-and-forth between the public 
and the police.81 Or that those most affected by policing practices are unlikely 
to make their way through dense policies and submit written comments.82 
Others have argued that the public comment period typically comes too late 
in the process, after the agency has largely decided on its preferred course of 
conduct.83 
Police rulemaking proponents in turn have suggested a number of ways 
to make rulemaking procedures more democratic, more timely, and more 
accessible to the public at large. Agencies could, for example, hold 
community meetings instead of soliciting written comments—and they 
could hold these meetings directly in the neighborhoods that are most likely 
to experience policing’s effects.84 Alternatively, agencies could create 
advisory councils or “deliberative panels” made up of residents from 
different backgrounds to ensure all voices are heard.85 Or they could make 
the public comment process more accessible by creating short surveys that 
ask residents to weigh in on some of the key tradeoffs involved in any 
particular policy.86 And of course, agencies could be required to check in 
 
YEAR RECRUITMENT PLAN (2017). The NYPD, meanwhile, published detailed training curricula on stop 
and frisk and bias-free policing as part of its own court-ordered reforms. See Training, NYPD MONITOR, 
http://nypdmonitor.org/reportsandotherdocuments/training/ [https://perma.cc/J6AN-XMM6]. 
 80 See, e.g., Luna, supra note 7, at 599–600 (calling for a “floor of procedural justice” that would 
promote transparency in criminal law rulemaking); Simmons, supra note 11, at 402–04. 
 81 See Simmons, supra note 11, at 404. 
 82 See generally David Thatcher, Equity and Community Policing: A New View of Community 
Partnerships, 20 CRIM. J. ETHICS 3, 3 (2001) (noting generally that not all members of the community 
are equally positioned to make their voices heard). 
 83 Simmons, supra note 11, at 404. 
 84 See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1888 (suggesting community meetings as 
a possible alternative); Slobogin, supra note 11, at 997 (suggesting CCTV cameras and other surveillance 
systems could be approved by a “neighborhood council” after “meaningful consultation with the affected 
populace”). 
 85 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 11, at 550 (proposing deliberative panels with equal voice to all 
affected parties as a more democratic alternative); Simmons, supra note 11, at 425 (praising the use of 
stakeholder groups as part of the Cincinnati collaborative reform effort). 
 86 The Policing Project, where I serve as Deputy Director, helped the NYPD draft such a survey to 
obtain input on its body-worn camera policy. See also Simmons, supra note 11, at 425 (pointing to the 
use of questionnaires as part of the Cincinnati collaborative reform effort). 
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with the public at an earlier point in time to ensure that the input has a greater 
chance of having an effect.87 
3. Resource Constraints 
Finally, a number of scholars have acknowledged that most policing 
agencies lack the resources and sophistication necessary to comply with an 
APA-style rulemaking regime. The United States has nearly 18,000 law 
enforcement agencies, nearly half of which employ fewer than ten officers.88 
It simply “is implausible that each of these jurisdictions is going to be able 
to adopt federal notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.”89 
But this objection, too, is hardly fatal. Professor Slobogin notes, for 
example, that smaller agencies could “piggyback on policies developed by 
their larger counterparts”—or, as already happens, purchase their policies off 
the shelf.90 And there are plenty of models for how agencies in smaller 
municipalities could solicit feedback.91 The Chicago suburb of Park Ridge, 
Illinois, for example, has twenty-three commissions and task forces to 
facilitate public input on everything from public libraries to historic 
preservation. There is no reason to think that these sorts of governance 
structures could not be adapted to facilitate greater engagement between 
communities and their police.92 As we wrote in Democratic Policing, “[t]he 
challenge is going to be figuring out how to elicit community participation 
in communities of all sizes. But this is a beneficial challenge, not a 
disheartening one.”93 
 
*          *          * 
 
 
 87 See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1888 (suggesting community meetings as 
a possible alternative); Simmons, supra note 11, at 404 (proposing a more “bottom-up” model of 
rulemaking); Slobogin, supra note 11, at 997 (suggesting CCTV cameras and other surveillance systems 
could be approved by a “neighborhood council” after “meaningful consultation with the affected 
populace”). 
 88 BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND 
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 2 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf
/csllea08.pdf [https://perma.cc/53H3-2M9J]. 
 89 Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1886; see also Luna, supra note 7, at 599 
(acknowledging that traditional rulemaking may be too cumbersome); Slobogin, Policing as 
Administration, supra note 9, at 135 (noting that smaller departments “might have great difficulty 
constructing and explaining rules.”). 
 90 Slobogin, Policing as Administration, supra note 9, at 135. On the use of purchased policies, see 
Ingrid V. Eagly & Joanna C. Schwartz, Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking, 96 TEX. L. 
REV. 891 (2018). 
 91 Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1888. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
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In sum, scholars have over the years pointed to a variety of problems 
with policing—and they have argued forcefully that many of these problems 
stem from our failure to subject policing agencies to the same administrative 
constraints that prevail throughout the regulatory state. Although they have 
at times acknowledged the various obstacles that their proposals would face, 
the conventional case against police rulemaking has done little to shake the 
perception that administrative rulemaking, or its more democratic 
alternatives, is the solution to policing’s various ills. 
II. GOVERNING POLICING THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE RULES 
The real problem with proposals to extend administrative rulemaking 
to the policing space is that policing agencies are fundamentally different 
from the sorts of agencies in which rulemaking predominates. The 
differences between policing agencies and more traditional administrative 
agencies poses four sets of challenges to the viability of any police 
rulemaking regime. 
First, perhaps the biggest obstacle to police rulemaking is that unlike 
traditional administrative agencies, policing agencies often lack the incentive 
to adopt rules in the first place. Second, although a legislature could require 
policing agencies to write rules, in practice, this often would be quite difficult 
to do. Even if they do adopt rules, a third concern is the increased challenge 
in the policing context of specifying when a department should be required 
to obtain public input on those rules. Finally, it is much harder for the public 
to meaningfully affect policing outcomes by weighing in periodically on 
police department rules. In short, although rulemaking may be a promising 
strategy for regulating certain aspects of policing, like the use of surveillance 
technologies, it is likely to fall considerably short in most. 
A. Why Policing Agencies Adopt Rules (and Why They Don’t) 
The public will not have an opportunity to comment on the rules that 
govern policing unless the department decides to adopt rules in the first 
place. This may seem obvious—and yet this crucial point often is 
overlooked. This Section explains that notice-and-comment rulemaking 
requirements work relatively well in the traditional administrative agency 
context because agencies have strong incentives to write rules. For policing 
agencies, however, the incentives to write rules are quite a bit weaker. Left 
to their own devices, policing agencies are unlikely to adopt the sorts of rules 
that are needed to address the various problems that have plagued policing 
for decades. 
When scholars argue that policing should be governed through 
rulemaking, what they typically have in mind are these notice-and-comment 
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provisions of the Federal APA. As is common knowledge, the APA requires 
agencies to make certain kinds of rules available for public comment.94 
Agencies are then required to respond to the substance of whatever 
comments they receive before the rules can go into effect.95 This back-and-
forth of comments and responses becomes the basis for judicial review.96 
Some policing scholars, like Professor Davis, have been explicit in urging 
this federal model.97 Others have acknowledged that federal rulemaking 
procedures may be too elaborate for the nation’s 18,000 police departments, 
and have argued in favor of “a relaxed administrative-type rulemaking 
process” that still shares some of the key features of the federal regime.98 
What these scholars largely have failed to take account of, however, is 
that the APA does not require agencies to adopt rules in the first place. Under 
the longstanding principle that the Court first announced in S.E.C. v. Chenery 
Corp. (Chenery II), it largely falls within an agency’s discretion to decide 
whether to simply enforce a statute as written, or whether to clarify or 
elaborate upon the statute by issuing a rule.99 An agency may sometimes be 
required to adopt a rule because the statute that it enforces is not self-
executing—which is to say that until an agency adopts a rule, the statute itself 
has no effect.100 But by and large, agencies have a great deal of discretion in 
 
 94 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: 
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 541–42 (2003) 
(describing the function of rulemaking); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 
38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1295–1315 (1986) (describing evolution of rulemaking procedures). The APA 
exempts certain kinds of rules from these requirements, including informal agency guidelines, as well as 
“internal” rules that bind agency officials but not the public. These lines are hardly clear, and there is a 
cottage industry of scholarship and case law devoted to making sense of these distinctions. See, e.g., 
Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should 
Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1321–27 (1992); Jacob E. Gersen, 
Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1719 (2007); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative 
Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 917–23 (2004). 
 95 Id. 
 96 See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252–53 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(invalidating a rule because the agency failed to adequately respond to public comments). 
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(using the APA as “the template for discussing the types of restrictions that administrative law might 
place on panvasive police actions”); Walker, supra note 7, at 389 (calling for police rulemaking statutes 
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 98 Luna, supra note 7, at 603; see also Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1886–87 
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departments); Simmons, supra note 11, at 402–03. 
 99 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947); see also Bressman, supra note 94, at 534–35 (noting enduring 
commitment to Chenery II even among those who favor greater rulemaking). 
 100 See Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. 
L. REV. 253, 256 (1986) (noting that because certain statutes “leave the development of substantive 
standards to the relevant agencies, they specifically or effectively require rulemaking”). The Clean Air 
Act, for example, requires the EPA to set emission standards for any substance it considers to be an “air 
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deciding whether or not to adopt rules.101 To some extent, because the APA 
imposes costly procedural requirements on agency rulemaking, it actually 
discourages agencies from adopting or modifying their rules.102 
Yet, despite the fact that rulemaking is mostly discretionary—and often 
costly—federal agencies still issue lots and lots of rules. The Department of 
Health and Human Services issued ninety-two “significant” rules in 2016 
alone—and many more technical regulations that were narrower in their 
effect.103 The Transportation Department and the Environmental Protection 
Agency each issued twenty-eight significant rules in that same time period.104 
Federal agencies have also issued thousands of interpretive rules, guidance 
documents, and policy circulars, which are exempt from the notice-and-
comment provisions of the APA but still are not entirely costless to draft and 
adopt.105 Agencies, in short, are awash in rules. 
Traditional agencies adopt rules primarily for two reasons: because 
rules make it easier for agencies to govern the public, and because rules make 
it easier for agencies to govern themselves. As the rest of this Section makes 
clear, the first of these rationales simply does not apply to policing agencies. 
The second may be more apt to the policing context—but it is not sufficient, 
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 104 See Federal Register, www.federalregister.gov (limiting search by “rule,” deemed “significant,” 
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 105 See Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 
92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 399 (2007) (pointing out that the EPA issued some 2,000 guidance documents 
between 1996 and 1999); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 
32 TULSA L.J. 185, 185 (1996) (noting that “[e]very major agency has a file room full of . . . staff manuals, 
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on its own, to encourage policing agencies to adopt rules in all of the 
circumstances in which we as a society might want them. 
1. Policing Rules to Govern Us? 
One reason that traditional agencies adopt rules is because rules often 
make it easier for agencies to accomplish their regulatory goals. Although 
Congress sometimes regulates with a great deal of specificity, many of the 
statutory provisions that agencies enforce can be quite broad.106 Statutes 
routinely use terms like “adequate,” “prominent,” and “fair and equitable.”107 
From an agency’s perspective, there are a number of advantages to reducing 
these vague standards to more specific rules. Rules promote greater 
compliance with legal norms by making clear to regulated entities what the 
law requires.108 Rules also reduce agency enforcement costs.109 Once an 
agency adopts a valid legislative rule, it no longer needs to prove in 
subsequent enforcement proceedings that the conduct at issue violates the 
underlying statute, only that it runs afoul of the agency rule.110 It is much 
easier for an agency to prove that a seven-foot fence is less than eight feet 
tall than it is to prove that the seven-foot fence is not the “appropriate” height 
to safely contain a lion.111 Rules, in short, often make it easier for an agency 
to get the public to do what the agency wants.112 
Policing agencies differ from traditional administrative agencies in one 
very critical but overlooked way: unlike traditional administrative agencies, 
policing agencies are not authorized to regulate the public through 
 
 106 See Manning, supra note 94, at 898. 
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§ 352(c) (2012) (requiring certain information to be “prominently placed” on drug labels); see also 
Manning, supra note 94, at 898 (listing others). 
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 111 See Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1996) (using this example to 
describe interpretation of rules). 
 112 This does not mean, of course, that agencies always will prefer rules to case-by-case adjudication. 
Rules may themselves be costly to write. Agencies may be concerned that any rules they adopt will be 
over- or underinclusive in ways that frustrate agency goals. There is a rich literature on the relative merits 
of articulating policy through rules or refining it over time through individual enforcement proceedings. 
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49, 83–90 (2007) (discussing this problem in the context of antitrust enforcement). But see Kaplow, supra 
note 108, at 593–96 (questioning the assumption about the relative over- or underinclusiveness of rules). 
What matters for present purposes is that agencies often benefit from having rules—which makes agency 
rules a logical focal point for public oversight. 
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department rules.113 Police are charged with enforcing the criminal law, but 
they are not permitted to alter its scope. A police department could not issue 
a rule banning certain kinds of drug-related activities—or permitting 
others—and expect a court, or anyone else for that matter, to enforce it.114 
The only obligations that policing agencies enforce are those that legislatures 
themselves adopt. The obligation to stop or pull over in response to a lawful 
police order, for example, does not derive from police department policy but 
rather from a state’s substantive criminal law.115 A department rule could not 
formally narrow or expand that obligation in any way—which means that at 
least some of the reasons why traditional agencies adopt rules simply do not 
apply to the police. 
Of course, as Professor Davis points out, traditional agencies also issue 
thousands of interpretive rules, guidance documents, and internal rules that 
are only binding on agency officials—and there is nothing to stop the police 
from doing the same.116 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), for example, also lacks the authority to issue binding rules in some 
contexts, but nevertheless issues nonbinding guidelines with some 
frequency.117 The EEOC uses these guidelines to explain how the agency 
plans to interpret certain statutory requirements and to make clear to 
regulated entities what they must do in order to comply. Likewise, a police 
department could announce that it will only enforce marijuana possession 
laws against individuals caught smoking marijuana in public, or that 
motorists will not be pulled over for certain kinds of equipment violations if 
that is the only offense. 
But even when it comes to these sorts of rules and guidelines, policing 
agencies have fewer incentives than do traditional administrative agencies to 
adopt them. This is because even when traditional agency rules are not 
binding on the public, they still help agencies regulate the public in ways 
policing rules simply do not. 
Much of the difference between traditional agency rules and police 
department rules has to do with the comparative content of civil and criminal 
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law—and by extension, the function that agency rules perform. One of the 
defining features of many civil regulatory statutes is their ambiguity.118 
Terms like “equitable” or “hazardous” are susceptible to any number of 
reasonable interpretations, and absent agency guidance, regulated entities 
may come to very different conclusions about what the law requires.119 If an 
agency wants the public to conform in a particular manner, it may help to 
announce its preference through guidelines or interpretive rules. Another key 
feature of civil regulatory statutes is their complexity.120 Agency guidelines 
can help clarify what is required, thereby ensuring that those who wish to 
comply with the law can do so.121 Studies suggest that in practice, this is 
precisely what occurs: even when agency guidelines are nonbinding, 
regulated entities tend to alter their conduct in response.122 
In contrast, the defining feature of criminal law is not its ambiguity (or 
its complexity) but rather its breadth.123 There are exceptions, to be sure, 
particularly when it comes to federal criminal prohibitions against bribery, 
securities fraud, and other white-collar offenses.124 But the chief criticism 
against most ordinary criminal statutes, such as the laws prohibiting 
gambling, drinking in public, or smoking marijuana, is not that they are 
unclear. Rather, it is that they criminalize broad swaths of conduct that many 
people routinely engage in, which gives police a great deal of license to pick 
and choose when to enforce them.125 The same is true of traffic laws, as well 
as the myriad quasi-criminal administrative codes that police officers also 
enforce.126 The problem is not that people may come to different conclusions 
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about what constitutes jaywalking, driving with a broken taillight, or failing 
to come to a complete stop. The problem is that there are so many laws on 
the books that virtually everyone is susceptible to being stopped at any time. 
For this reason, the sorts of substantive enforcement guidelines that 
scholars have urged policing agencies to adopt are not designed to clarify the 
criminal law, but rather to narrow its scope. Professor Davis pointed out, for 
example, that Chicago police officers distinguished between “social” and 
“commercial” gambling and only enforced gambling laws against the 
latter.127 They also rarely, if ever, enforced laws against riding a bicycle on a 
sidewalk, jaywalking, or even smoking marijuana in public.128 It was 
precisely these sorts of decisions that Professor Davis urged departments to 
formalize through binding rules.129 As discussed below, there may be other 
reasons why policing agencies would find these sorts of guidelines valuable 
internally—but it is not because they help police enforce the criminal laws 
by making clear to the public what the laws require.130 Indeed, there is every 
reason for the police to avoid adopting these rules so as not to provide the 
public with a guidepost for how to engage in conduct that the legislature has 
deemed impermissible. 
Rules, in short, do not make it easier for the police to govern us—which 
means that the operative question is whether and when policing agencies 
need rules to govern themselves. Once the question is framed in this manner, 
it becomes much easier to predict when policing agencies are likely to have 
rules and when they are not. 
2. Policing Rules to Govern Themselves? 
Traditional agencies also adopt rules in order to guide and constrain the 
actions of agency staff. All agencies need some rules simply to function in 
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the police do, not to what police rules say. 
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an orderly manner. Rules promote uniformity and increase the likelihood that 
like cases will be treated alike.131 Rules and guidelines also make it easier for 
agency heads to impose their will on sprawling—and often far-flung—
bureaucracies.132 The vast majority of agency staff members are career 
officials who may hold views that are inconsistent with those of whatever 
administration currently is in power.133 Rules and guidelines help ensure that 
low-level officials act more in accordance with the wishes of agency heads.134 
Many of these reasons apply to policing agencies as well. Like 
traditional agencies, policing agencies rely on rules to ensure orderly 
function, addressing issues like organizational structure, chain of command, 
handling of equipment, grievance procedures, and paid leave. Police 
department manuals devote hundreds of pages to just these sorts of rules.135 
And like all agencies, policing agencies benefit from having at least some 
internal rules to guide how officers behave out in the field. Additionally, they 
may implement rules to limit legal liability. But, as this Section makes clear, 
police departments often lack the incentive to adopt the sorts of rules needed 
to address the problems identified in Part I. 
a. Cabining Line Officer Discretion 
One reason why policing agencies may want to adopt rules is to ensure 
that officer-level decisions reflect the policy preferences of agency heads. 
Chiefs may have strong views about how officers should conduct 
themselves. For example, chiefs have tended to be more progressive, or at 
least more supportive of innovation, than have the rank-and-file.136 Police 
executive organizations, like the Police Executive Research Forum, have 
supported reform efforts across a variety of domains, including use of 
surveillance technology and the use of force.137 Department rules are one way 
that chiefs can impose these views on the agency as a whole. 
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An important countervailing force, however, is that policing agencies 
also often benefit from giving officers greater leeway to decide which laws 
to enforce and when. In the hands of the officer, the breadth of criminal law 
is itself a potent tool. As Professor David Harris notes, “with the traffic code 
in hand, any officer can stop any driver any time.”138 This means that an 
officer who suspects a motorist, for whatever reason, of being involved in 
criminal activity, but lacks the requisite suspicion to stop the person on that 
basis, can instead pull the driver over for a minor infraction and investigate 
further. Even if an officer does have reasonable suspicion, the officer may 
still prefer to wait for a violation in order to avoid having to litigate the matter 
at a subsequent suppression hearing. These sorts of pretextual stops have 
been sharply criticized by civil liberties groups, academics, and occasionally 
the courts.139 But they unfortunately are common, and commonly encouraged 
by department brass.140 
Discretion might be more of a problem for policing agencies were it not 
for the fact that those who bear the brunt of excess discretion typically are 
not in a position to make things politically difficult for chiefs. The 
unfortunate reality is that the costs of discretion tend to fall 
disproportionately on communities that are marginalized politically.141 
Professor James Forman Jr. points out, for example, that in majority-black 
Washington, D.C., the sorts of policing practices that were the norm in poor 
black neighborhoods were never used in the more affluent black 
neighborhoods where residents were in a better position to complain.142 
There also are countervailing political pressures that may further 
discourage rulemaking. Officers and their unions are a potent political force, 




 138 Harris, supra note 126, at 559; see also Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 
51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 376–79 (1998). 
 139 See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2065–66 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Harris, 
supra note 126, at 560 (arguing that police will use their power to conduct pretextual stops “mostly to 
stop African-Americans and Hispanics”). 
 140 See, e.g., GIDEON’S ARMY & NASHVILLE CMTY. ORGS. & LEADERS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: A 
REPORT ON RACIAL PROFILING IN METRO NASHVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT TRAFFIC STOPS 25 (2016), 
https://drivingwhileblacknashville.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/driving-while-black-gideons-army.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J5XK-Z976] (finding that Nashville officers were trained to make low-level stops and 
then try to obtain consent to search vehicles for drugs or contraband). 
 141 See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; 
Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 
1089 (1993). 
 142 JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 209–
11 (2017). 
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will oppose.143 Moreover, chiefs may simply not want to stick their necks out 
by adopting enforcement guidelines and other policies that draw public 
attention to the department’s practices.144 The reason why scholars are in 
favor of rules—to increase salience and ensure greater political 
accountability—is the same reason why chiefs ultimately may be reluctant 
to voluntarily adopt them. 
In any event, rules are just one way that police officials shape officer 
behavior. Department leadership can communicate their priorities through 
CompStat meetings, roll call, training, officer evaluations, and direct orders 
down the chain of command.145 A policing agency cannot conduct its 
business entirely through word of mouth. But in many cases these alternative 
mechanisms may be just as effective at making the department’s preferences 
known. This is particularly true in contexts where rules may be difficult to 
write with any degree of precision or are likely to attract the sort of attention 
that chiefs might prefer to avoid. 
b. Avoiding Legal Liability 
Another reason why police departments sometimes may want to adopt 
rules is financial: to avoid the costs associated with lawsuits and complaints 
that may arise as a result of officer misconduct. The potential threat of legal 
liability, however, can both encourage and discourage agency rules. 
Under the rule announced in Monell v. Department of Social Services 
of New York, agencies are not directly liable for officer misconduct.146 The 
familiar doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply when government 
agents are sued for violating a person’s constitutional rights. Agencies are 
held liable only if plaintiffs can show that an officer’s misconduct resulted 
directly from an established agency policy. Monell also potentially creates a 
perverse incentive for agencies to avoid putting certain policies in writing, 
lest the policies themselves be found to run afoul of constitutional law. 
The significance of Monell, however, is diminished by the fact that the 
vast majority of agencies indemnify their officers against any liability that 
the officers personally may face.147 As a result, even if agencies are not 
 
 143 See Dripps, supra note 141, at 1091; Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 
85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 744–47 (2017). 
 144 Luna, supra note 7, at 608. 
 145 See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 591–602 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing a 
range of ways that officials communicated priorities to officers). 
 146 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 
 147 Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 885 (2014) (finding that 
governments “paid approximately 99.98% of the dollars that plaintiffs recovered in lawsuits alleging civil 
rights violations by law enforcement”). 
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themselves held liable, they still are likely to pay.148 This puts at least some 
pressure on agencies to develop policies that reduce the likelihood of 
misconduct that could lead to large damage awards.149 In fact, there now are 
companies like Lexipol, which specialize in developing off-the-shelf policies 
for law enforcement agencies that minimize agencies’ financial risks.150 
Concerns with possible legal liability, however, are limited to a fairly 
narrow set of police policy domains. First, legal liability arises primarily in 
areas that already are governed by statutory or constitutional law. But 
constitutional law has almost nothing to say about police use of enforcement 
discretion.151 Nor does the Constitution do much to regulate surveillance that 
falls short of a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment—
which under current law includes CCTV cameras, license plate readers, 
social media monitoring, and at least some collection of personal data from 
third parties.152 Statutory law around policing is equally thin.153 Second, as 
Professor John Rappaport has pointed out, the threat of legal liability is more 
likely to spur agency policymaking in circumstances in which officer 
misconduct could lead to large damage awards, like use of force.154 
Financially minded agencies may be less concerned about unlawful stops 
and arrests or the misuse of surveillance technology, which typically involve 
lower value claims and are less often litigated.155 
 
 148 Of course, as Professor Joanna Schwartz points out, these financial signals may be muted by the 
fact that agencies do not always pay these costs directly, because they are paid either by municipal insurers 
or out of municipal general funds. Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and 
Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1173–78, 1188 (2016). 
 149 Id. at 1188–92. 
 150 See Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 90, at 923–29. 
 151 See Barkow, supra note 25, at 1135 (“Police officers and prosecutors possess enormous discretion 
over whom to stop, arrest, and charge—and for what. Courts largely sit on the sidelines.”); Mariano-
Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227, 227 (2006) (noting that 
courts rarely review decisions about which laws to enforce and against whom). 
 152 See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1871–75. The Court is gradually adjusting the 
definition of a search to capture certain kinds of surveillance technologies but is unlikely to ever keep up 
with the rapid pace of technological change. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 
(2018) (holding that acquiring long-term cell-site location data from a third party constitutes a search); 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012) (holding that long-term GPS surveillance constitutes a 
search). 
 153 See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1843 (arguing that there is “remarkably little 
legislative direction for America’s policing officials”). 
 154 John Rappaport, An Insurance-Based Typology of Police Misconduct, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
369, 376–77 (2016). 
 155 Id. at 395–97. Agencies still face the possibility of costly injunctive suits, which may encourage 
proactive policymaking to some degree. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 667 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that New York City’s stop and frisk policy is unconstitutional and noting the 
need for “immediate changes to the [NYPD’s] policies”). 
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3. When Policing Agencies Have Rules 
In view of the complex incentive structure facing policing agencies, one 
would expect a great deal of variance in the degree to which various aspects 
of policing are governed through rules. Given liability concerns, for 
example, one would expect agencies to have at least some policies around 
the use of force. On the other hand, one would expect to see few if any rules 
to cabin enforcement discretion, because policing agencies rarely benefit 
from having these sorts of rules. Rules concerning the use of surveillance 
technologies could go either way. Agencies may be less concerned with legal 
liability, both because surveillance tends to fall beyond the reach of 
constitutional law, and because damages from any instances of misconduct 
are likely to be quite small. But because surveillance typically is aimed at a 
broader subset of the public, chiefs may face greater political pressure to 
make clear how the technologies are to be used. 
In practice, this is precisely what we get. Most if not all agencies have 
rules for when force may be used, as well as how it must be documented and 
reviewed.156 These policies may not be very good and may be missing critical 
elements—but arguably that is what public rulemaking procedures are 
supposed to fix.157 On the other hand, policies on the use of surveillance 
technologies, like automated license plate readers (ALPRs) and drones, tend 
to be more hit or miss. Studies suggest that although many agencies do in 
fact have policies on various technologies, others do not.158 One study, for 
example, found that just seventeen of the fifty-three agencies in 
Massachusetts that used ALPRs had written policies regarding their use.159 
But again, as is true for use of force, there is at least some likelihood of 
finding agency policies that directly contribute to how these technologies are 
used. 
 
 156 See Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 78, at 263–68 (describing key features of agency use of force 
policies). 
 157 See Bressman, supra note 94, at 541–44. 
 158 POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING 
SERVS., IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS 
LEARNED 2 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/472014912134715246869.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5LGK-DVBE]. 
 159 Shawn Musgrave, License Plate-Reading Devices Fuel Privacy Debate, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 9, 
2013), http://bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/04/08/big-brother-better-police-work-new-technology-
automatically-runs-license-plates-everyone/1qoAoFfgp31UnXZT2CsFSK/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/84Y8-LP4C]. In Carlsbad, California, the Electronic Frontier Foundation found that the 
only “policy” that the department had regarding the use of mobile face recognition technology was a 
technical manual from the manufacturer. See Dave Maass, Why California Urgently Needs Surveillance 
Transparency, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 6, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/06
/why-california-urgently-needs-surveillance-transparency [https://perma.cc/VHT5-J7VC]. 
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When it comes to traffic and pedestrian stops, rules play a still more 
limited role. Virtually every policing agency has a “search and seizure” 
policy that, more often than not, just restates the constitutional requirement 
that a stop be based on reasonable suspicion. In most agencies, however, a 
major driving force behind the use and abuse of traffic and pedestrian stops 
has been the “policy” of using large numbers of stops as a crime-fighting 
tool.160 And in none of these agencies has this “policy” been announced 
through anything that looks like a written rule. In New York City, for 
example, the plaintiffs in Floyd had to rely on circumstantial evidence, 
including notes from CompStat meetings, secret recordings, and officer 
surveys, to prove that the NYPD put pressure on officers to make large 
numbers of stops because there was no written policy to that effect.161 
Predictably, policing agencies have very few rules or guidelines in place 
to cabin enforcement discretion. Some departments have rules about when 
officers should issue a summons in lieu of making an arrest—though often 
these rules simply mirror state laws to that effect.162 But by and large even 
these rules are the exception that proves the rule. Notably absent from police 
manuals or other department-issued documents are the sorts of substantive 
enforcement guidelines that Professors Davis, Luna, and other rulemaking 
proponents have over the years urged policing agencies to adopt.163 Nor do 
agencies typically have rules in place to address the many other factors that 
influence enforcement outcomes, such as staffing and deployment. In light 
of the aforementioned discussion, it is easy to see why. 
 
*          *          * 
 
 
 160 See infra Part I. 
 161 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 591-602 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The only documents 
that came close to announcing a policy on aggressive street-level enforcement were two strategy 
documents that the New York City Mayor’s Office and the NYPD issued in 1994, which announced a 
new emphasis on low-level offenses and gun crimes. N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, NCJ 167805, POLICE 
STRATEGY NO. 1: GETTING GUNS OFF THE STREETS OF NEW YORK (1994); N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, NCJ 
167807, POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5: RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC SPACES OF NEW YORK (1994), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Photocopy/167807NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/AV58-LP93]. 
However, neither document in fact mentioned the use of stops. Even with the benefit of hindsight, these 
documents are at best a precursor to the aggressive stop and arrest strategies that the NYPD implemented 
in the two decades that followed. 
 162 See, e.g., OAKLAND POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER M-7: CITATIONS FOR ADULT 
MISDEMEANORS 2–3 (1996), http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca1/groups/police/documents/webcontent
/oak058222.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK7V-44NG] (describing a presumption in favor of a citation in lieu 
of arrest for misdemeanor offenses and listing the circumstances under which the presumption may be 
overridden as a matter of state law). 
 163 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 4; Livingston, supra note 7, at 658–63; Luna, supra note 7, at 603–
04. 
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Procedural rulemaking requirements along the lines of the Federal APA 
only work if agencies have an incentive to adopt rules in the first place. And 
because rulemaking procedures impose some additional costs on agencies, 
one would expect policing agencies subject to an APA-style regime to have 
even fewer rules. In order for rulemaking to have some effect on enforcement 
discretion—or even some areas of force and surveillance—there would need 
to be some mechanism in place to require rules. That is what this Article 
takes up next. 
B. Requiring Policing Agencies to Write Rules 
If policing agencies will not issue rules on their own, perhaps they 
should be made to do so. Over the years, a number of scholars have argued 
that if policing agencies will not adopt rules voluntarily, legislatures should 
require it.164 As this Section makes clear, however, mandatory rulemaking is 
most likely to be effective around precisely the sorts of policing practices 
that already tend to be governed through rules—and much less effective 
where such rules are absent. 
In order to make rulemaking mandatory, a legislative body must be able 
to specify when a policing agency needs to have a rule. In some cases, this 
may be fairly simple to do. Recall that in the traditional administrative 
context, agencies are sometimes required to adopt rules when the statutes 
they enforce are not self-executing.165 For example, before the EPA can 
regulate a particular substance, it must first adopt a rule declaring it to be a 
pollutant and setting appropriate emissions standards.166 The EPA can of 
course decide not to regulate the substance at all, but if it wants to act in a 
particular sphere, it needs the rule in order to do so.167 These sorts of 
 
 164 Professor Samuel Walker, for example, pointed out in 1986 that policing agencies were not 
exactly rushing to bind themselves through rules, and urged legislatures to require rules around use of 
force, stop and frisk, and other investigative techniques. Walker, supra note 7, at 382–83. Catherine 
Crump has argued in favor of mandatory rulemaking—and legislative approval—around police use of 
various surveillance technologies. Crump, supra note 11, at 1656–59. Both Professors Anthony 
Amsterdam and Kenneth Culp Davis urged courts to interpret the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
require policing agency rules, but courts have by and large dismissed the invitation to do so. DAVIS, supra 
note 4, at 98–120; Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 416–18. Although Barry Friedman and I pointed out in 
Democratic Policing where there may be space to push existing law in that direction, it is unlikely that 
constitutional law will change anytime soon. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1892–1903. 
For this reason, judicially-mandated rules are largely beyond the scope of this Article. Court-ordered 
rulemaking also would face many of the same sorts of line-drawing problems discussed here. 
 165 See Morrison, supra note 100, at 256 (noting that because certain statutes “leave the development 
of substantive standards to the relevant agencies, they specifically or effectively require rulemaking”). 
 166 Clean Air Act (CAA) § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012). 
 167 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court imposed some outer limits on these sorts of choices. 549 U.S. 
497, 527–28 (2007). 
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rulemaking requirements are both easy to articulate and, to a large extent, 
self-enforcing. 
For certain aspects of policing, one can imagine an analogous set of 
requirements. Take, for example, the use of various surveillance 
technologies. One reason why it may be possible to require rules in this 
context is because the decision to adopt a new technology involves a discrete 
change to the status quo. The agency did not have Stingrays (or license plate 
readers, or predictive policing technology), and then it did. There is a clear 
“before” and “after” and thus a fixed point in time when the agency may be 
required to adopt a rule. It perhaps makes sense, then, that surveillance is one 
area of policing in which legislatures have in fact experimented with 
requiring police department rules. A small number of cities, including 
Seattle, Berkeley, and Nashville, have passed ordinances requiring their local 
police departments to obtain city council approval and adopt a written policy 
before deploying a new surveillance technology.168 In California and Illinois, 
agencies are required as a matter of state law to have policies in place before 
deploying certain technologies, such as license plate readers or body-worn 
cameras.169 
For other areas of policing, however, a rulemaking requirement would 
be much harder to devise. Consider for example the NYPD’s “policy” of 
using large numbers of stops to drive down crime. It is hard to imagine a 
rulemaking requirement that would have forced the department to announce 
this policy in the form of an ex ante rule. Over the years, NYPD commanders 
made a number of decisions—about staffing, deployment, officer 
evaluations, and department strategy—that ultimately resulted in the set of 
practices that plaintiffs challenged in Floyd. But there was no fixed point in 
time when the NYPD went from not using stops at all to using them en 
masse.170 Unlike new surveillance technologies, stops are a tool that officers 
have always had at their disposal. The changes that took place were a matter 
of degree. Even in retrospect, it is not clear at what point the NYPD ought to 
have adopted a rule. 
The difficulty is greater still when it comes to the use of enforcement 
discretion, albeit for a different set of reasons. In order to get a police 
department to cabin officer discretion, the legislature must be able to do two 
 
 168 BERKELEY, CAL., ORDINANCE 7592 (2018); NASHVILLE, TENN., ORDINANCE BL2017-646 (June 
7, 2017); SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 124142 (2017). 
 169 California Automated License Plate Recognition Systems Law, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 
(2018); Police Community Improvement Act, ILL. COMP. STAT. 727/1-1 (2018). 
 170 Stop and frisk has of course been used as an investigative tactic for decades. See, e.g., Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 7 (1968). On the evolution of stop and frisk in New York City, see Floyd v. City of 
New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 565–69 (2013). 
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things: articulate what sorts of rules are required and how specific they must 
be. 
The first is tricky because different criminal statutes raise different 
kinds of concerns. In some contexts—such as domestic violence or sexual 
assault—the concern is that police do not take allegations seriously or are 
more responsive to some classes of victims than they are to others.171 When 
it comes to traffic laws, however, or other low-level offenses, the concern 
instead is that criminal law sweeps too broadly, which gives police far too 
much discretion to decide when to enforce them.172 The sorts of rules needed 
to address the former would look quite different than rules to address the 
latter—and a rulemaking requirement would need to make clear what sorts 
of rules are needed when. 
The greater challenge is that, unless the legislature can also articulate 
how specific the rules must be, a policing agency could avoid any 
rulemaking mandate by issuing rules that themselves are models of 
vagueness and ambiguity. A legislature could, for example, require a police 
department to develop guidelines to cabin enforcement of certain low-level 
offenses. The goal of any such requirement would be to get the department 
to make clear when these laws would not be enforced—or would be enforced 
through less aggressive means. The problem is that nothing would prevent 
the department from simply announcing that it takes these laws seriously and 
plans to enforce them as written (whether or not that is, in practice, what 
occurs). If the goal is to get a police department to narrow the scope of 
criminal law, a legislature would need to be able to articulate not only which 
laws need narrowing but also, importantly, how narrow is narrow enough. It 
is easy to point to a particular statute and suggest ways in which it could be 
narrowed. It is much harder, however, to describe a standard for judging a 
police department’s decision to enforce the statute as is. This is precisely 
why legislatures and courts have typically refrained from imposing 
rulemaking requirements on traditional agencies as well.173 
Other areas of policing fall somewhere between the two extremes of 
surveillance technology and enforcement discretion. It may not be possible 
to come up with a single rulemaking requirement to ensure that police 
establish rules across a variety of policy domains. But for critical areas that 
legislators and the public are most likely to care about—such as use of force 
or the use of informants—a legislature potentially could enumerate what 
policies an agency must have. However, doing so would not be without its 
 
 171 See Natapoff, supra note 53, at 1731–39. 
 172 See Harris, supra note 126, at 557–58. 
 173 See Manning, supra note 94, at 896. Professor John Manning makes this argument in the context 
of the judicially-enforced Chenery II rule, but the same rationale applies to legislatures as well. 
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challenges. To have real bite, such a requirement would likely need to 
specify not only the topics on which an agency must have a policy in place 
but also the specific issues that each policy must address. And it would need 
to be updated as policing evolves in ways that raise new policy concerns. All 
of this may be possible in theory, but it would require legislators to do more 
than simply agree, at a particular moment, to change the process through 
which policing agencies adopt their rules. 
Accordingly, if policing agencies decline to issue rules independently, 
even mandatory rulemaking is unlikely to reach the types of policing 
problems that are of greatest public concern. 
C. Determining Which Policies Require Public Input 
An additional challenge to implementing a public rulemaking regime 
around policing is that a legislature would need to be able to specify which 
policies require public input and which do not. The goal of any such 
requirement is readily apparent: to ensure that the public has a say in the 
policies that affect them, while giving the department leeway to proceed 
more expeditiously for those that are less consequential. However, 
translating that goal into a rule—or even into a standard—is easier said than 
done. 
At the federal level, the APA requires agencies to go through notice-
and-comment rulemaking when they adopt “legislative” rules that impose 
new obligations on the public or bind the public in some way.174 Interpretive 
rules, guidance documents, and rules having to do with internal agency 
management are exempt from the notice-and-comment provisions of the 
APA.175 A number of scholars have questioned whether the APA draws the 
line in the right place, but all agree that a line must be drawn somewhere.176 
Agencies issue thousands of documents that arguably could be called 
“rules.” Government would grind to a halt if each of these documents were 
subject to the notice-and-comment requirements of the APA. And in all 
likelihood, agencies would simply issue far fewer guidance documents and 
rules, to the detriment of the rule of law values that rules promote.177 
Although courts have struggled over the years to apply the various 
distinctions between “legislative” and “non-legislative” rules with any 
 
 174 See id. at 893 (citations omitted). The phrase “legislative rule” does not appear in the text of the 
APA itself, but it has been used by commentators and courts to describe the category of rules to which 
notice-and-comment requirements apply. 
 175 See Anthony, supra note 94, at 1323. 
 176 See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 94, at 1355–56; Manning, supra note 94, at 894–96. 
 177 See David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 
120 YALE L.J. 276, 306 (2010). 
114:1 (2019) Rethinking Police Rulemaking 
37 
degree of coherence,178 what matters for present purposes is that most if not 
all police department policies fall well outside the debatable line of what 
constitutes a “legislative” rule. As Barry Friedman and I explain in 
Democratic Policing, this is because police rules are internal.179 Although 
police rules can certainly be of great consequence for the public, the police 
are not permitted, as a matter of law, to bind the public or formally alter the 
public’s rights (i.e., to tell the public itself how to behave).180 There may be 
a narrow subset of police rules that arguably could trigger rulemaking 
obligations. Some courts, for example, have deemed certain kinds of 
enforcement guidelines to be “legislative” rules.181 But in order to reach the 
vast majority of police conduct, a rulemaking requirement for policing 
agencies would need a new standard for distinguishing between those 
policies that require public input and those that do not. 
The first challenge to defining when comment is required in the policing 
context is deciding what constitutes a policy or rule in the first place. The 
APA describes a “rule” as “an agency statement of general or particular 
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe 
law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice 
requirements of an agency.”182 Such a definition, if applied to the policing 
context, arguably would reach not only the formal “policies” contained in a 
department manual or set of general orders but also unit manuals, standard 
operating procedures, organizational charts, department memoranda, and 
possibly even training materials or guides, to the extent that they 
“implement” an agency’s policy choices. If police departments were required 
to get public input on every single document that the agency produced, they 
likely would have time for little else—or may simply decide to put fewer 
things in writing. 
 
 178 This is because sometimes an internal agency rule or guidance document may be phrased in such 
a way that it functions, in practice, like a binding rule. See Anthony, supra note 94, at 1315. 
 179 Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1857. 
 180 Id. 
 181 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. 
Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam); see also Barkow, supra note 25, at 1156–57. Professor Christopher 
Slobogin also has argued that police rules that implement suspicionless search and seizure programs ought 
to be deemed “legislative” rules, though this would require courts to depart pretty substantially from 
existing law. Compare Slobogin, Policing As Administration, supra note 9, at 96 (“Because . . . panvasive 
searches and seizures are policy-driven, group-based, and suspicionless, they are legislative in nature.”), 
with U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1153–56 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding that 
agency rule concerning suspicionless inspections of regulated industries was not a “legislative rule” 
within the meaning of the APA). And in any event, these two areas cover only a narrow swath of police 
conduct. 
 182 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012). 
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The APA largely sidesteps this difficulty by calling everything a rule, 
but then defining a narrow class of rules that must be adopted through 
rulemaking procedures.183 Because “general statements of policy” and rules 
about “agency organization, procedure, or practice” are exempt from 
rulemaking requirements, courts can avoid deciding whether a department 
training manual or an internal office memorandum is in fact a “rule.”184 
In the policing context, there are a number of approaches that legislators 
could take to do the same, but each has its problems. Legislators could, for 
example, limit rulemaking to those policies and procedures that appear in a 
department’s policy manual or in its general orders. This would be an easy 
standard to administer but would be both over- and underinclusive. A 
department’s official policy manual contains dozens of administrative 
policies that likely are of little interest to the public. These include policies 
on uniform regulations, telephone protocols, grants management, and 
building security.185 On the other hand, the public may have a great deal of 
interest in knowing more about how officers are trained about when to use 
force—a topic that department manuals rarely address.186 And of course such 
a requirement would create a powerful incentive to keep certain directives 
out of the policy manual entirely. 
Legislators could—once again—enumerate the topics of concern. But 
in order to do so, they would need to describe not only the policies that ought 
to be subject to rulemaking but also the sorts of changes to those policies 
that would trigger rulemaking obligations. Should an agency be required to 
go through rulemaking to make any small change to a use of force policy? 
Perhaps. But what about changing the force reporting structure, or amending 
a form that officers must use, or tweaking the training curriculum in some 
way? 
Legislators could try instead to adopt a general standard to describe the 
sorts of policies on which the public would need to weigh in. In Democratic 
Policing, we pointed to a number of general standards that state courts have 
used to describe the sorts of questions on which rules or rulemaking might 
be required.187 A department could, for example, be required to get public 
input whenever it adopts or revises a policy that deals with “broad policy 
 
 183 Id. § 553(b)(3)(A). 
 184 Id. 
 185 See, e.g., AUSTIN POLICE DEPARTMENT supra note 135, at 469, 718, 727, 739 (2017). 
 186 See, e.g., id. at 630–36 (noting in places that training is required to perform certain functions, but 
not providing any information about what that training must include). 
 187 Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1882–83. 
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issues that affect the public at large” or touches on “important areas of social 
concern.”188 
As is true of all ambiguous standards, however, there is likely to be a 
great deal of uncertainty, at least initially, about when rulemaking is in fact 
required. One could argue, for example, that any change to a use of force 
investigation process has the potential to affect the public because it can 
increase or decrease the likelihood with which officers use force. But one 
could argue just as easily that minor changes to internal procedures should 
be exempt because the overall expectation about when officers may use force 
remains the same. 
In short, it certainly would be possible to come up with a plausible 
rulemaking requirement that captures at least some of the policy issues that 
have drawn public scrutiny. But doing so would raise a host of challenges 
that rulemaking proponents have yet to meaningfully confront. 
D. Relying on Rulemaking to Effect Policy Change 
Even assuming that all of the problems discussed above could be 
solved, the last—and perhaps most pressing—question is the degree to which 
police rulemaking can be expected to foster greater political accountability 
and effect real policy change. Although one goal of police rulemaking is 
simply to get the department itself to be more deliberate and thoughtful about 
its own policy choices, the driving objective for many rulemaking 
proponents is to fix policing by giving the public a greater say in how it is 
policed.189 The concern is to what extent rulemaking, or anything like it, can 
be expected to do that. 
As Part I notes, to the extent that scholars have questioned the feasibility 
of public rulemaking, they have argued that the problem is that rulemaking 
is not democratic enough—and in turn, have suggested various ways to make 
rulemaking more inclusive and accessible. 
This Section asks a more fundamental question: to what extent can one 
hope to improve policing by insisting that departments ask for periodic input 
on policing rules, no matter how democratically that input is obtained? 
In making the case for rulemaking, policing scholars have tended to 
reduce the rulemaking process to a series of referendum-style questions on 
which it is easy to imagine the public weighing in, and by offering up their 
views, potentially changing what the police do. Many of these “rulemaking 
questions” have been about the adoption of new technology: whether to 
 
 188 Id. at 1883 (quoting Crema v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 463 A.2d 910, 917 (N.J. 1983)). 
 189 See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1893–94; Livingston, supra note 7, at 653–
58; Slobogin, supra note 11, at 996–97. 
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permit the use of CCTV cameras in a particular neighborhood, for example, 
or whether a department should be permitted to acquire body cameras or 
drones.190 Others have envisioned public processes around narrow questions 
relating to use of force, such as whether officers should be required to 
deescalate potentially violent encounters before resorting to force.191 In 
Democratic Policing, we argued that the public should get to decide whether 
agencies use drunk-driving checkpoints and whether SWAT teams may be 
used to effectuate misdemeanor arrests.192 Professor Livingston suggested 
that police could invite residents to provide feedback on whether to permit 
rollerblading or biking in a particular city park.193 
All of these questions involve policy matters on which members of the 
public are likely to have strong views that may be different from those of the 
police. Acting on their own, police officials might be inclined to get the 
drone or to permit more expansive use of SWAT. If forced to justify their 
decisions to a skeptical public, however, they may decide to pursue a 
different course. 
In practice, however, most of the areas in which police rulemaking is 
needed cannot easily be reduced to these sorts of referendum moments. First, 
policing outcomes typically are shaped by many overlapping rules. When it 
comes to use of force, for example, there are rules for when force may be 
used, how it must be reported, and how it is investigated and reviewed. 
Agencies also have policies around the handling of complaints and the 
imposition of discipline. Each of these policies may be many pages in length 
and scattered across multiple documents.194 Use of force outcomes, in short, 
are the product of a system—one in which the agency’s core use of force 
policy is just one part. 
The systemic character of police policymaking has a number of 
important implications for the viability of democratic rulemaking. One 
significant limitation of rulemaking procedures is that they are designed 
primarily to regulate discrete changes to the status quo. Rulemaking 
requirements typically kick in when an agency proposes a new rule, a 
revision to an existing regulation, or a novel interpretation of an earlier 
 
 190 See, e.g., Crump, supra note 11, at 1605–15; Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1853; 
Slobogin, supra note 11, at 996–97. 
 191 See, e.g., Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems of 
Democracy, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 615, 657 (2016) (pointing to emphasis on de-escalation in community 
discussion over use of force in Seattle). 
 192 Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1846, 1848. 
 193 Livingston, supra note 7, at 646. 
 194 See, e.g., BALTIMORE DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 98 (describing the Baltimore Police 
Department’s policies regarding the use, reporting, and investigation of force as “scattered across multiple 
documents, making it difficult for officers to synthesize their guidance”). 
114:1 (2019) Rethinking Police Rulemaking 
41 
provision.195 And this proposed change is what the public is invited to 
comment on. Traditional rulemaking is not an invitation to rethink an entire 
regulatory scheme from top to bottom. 
For certain areas of policing, this is not necessarily an impediment to 
meaningful public input. When it comes to surveillance technology, for 
example, change is indeed what the public often cares about.196 The primary 
concern is that policing agencies will acquire new tools that substantially 
increase the government’s surveillance capacity, or put existing tools to new 
uses that may generate additional privacy or other costs.197 Even if the entire 
surveillance system is not up for debate in every rulemaking procedure, 
insisting that agencies get public input on discrete changes to surveillance 
policies and practices can help ensure that things do not get too out of hand. 
But in other policing contexts, it is much harder to imagine that the 
public can substantially affect outcomes by commenting on discrete changes 
to police rules. Consider again the use of force. One certainly can imagine 
specific changes that a department could propose that would benefit from 
public scrutiny—acquiring new weapons or equipment, for example, or 
raising the bar for accepting complaints. But by and large, change is not the 
problem. The problem is, and has for decades been, with the status quo. The 
operative question is not whether any given change is a good or a bad one. 
Rather, the question is which of the department’s many policies need to 
change, and in what ways, in order to reduce the amount of force that officers 
use. Rulemaking proponents have never been clear on which entity, either 
inside or outside the department, is expected to play that diagnostic role. 
This difficulty is compounded by the fact that when it comes to 
weighing in on policing policies, the public is at an informational 
disadvantage. In the traditional agency context, regulated entities have a 
great deal of information about how proposed agency rules will affect them 
because they are the ones who will have to comply.198 Indeed, one 
justification for notice-and-comment rulemaking is that private parties may 
have more information than the agency itself.199 
In the policing context, the public may lack the information it needs to 
participate fully. To be sure, community members unequivocally have 
 
 195 See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012) (defining “rulemaking” as the “agency process for formulating, 
amending, or repealing a rule”). 
 196 See Crump, supra note 11, at 1597–98 (citing concerns about procurement of new technologies). 
 197 See id. at 1643–46. 
 198 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L REV. 
1669, 1714–15 (1975). 
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valuable insight into how policing practices affect them. But they may not 
always be in a position to assess, from the outside, how police rules will 
affect the behavior of the police. It may be readily apparent from the outside 
that officers routinely use excessive force and that they rarely are punished 
as a result. But it may not always be clear which rules or practices within the 
department are contributing to this result—especially if the public has little 
to go on except the text of the rules themselves. 
This is particularly true when it comes to rules that regulate internal 
processes, such as officer discipline. As dozens of Justice Department 
investigations of local departments make clear, disciplinary systems can fail 
in any number of ways.200 And many of these failures are hard to detect by 
focusing solely on the substance of policing agency rules. In Chicago, for 
example, department policy required that disciplinary findings be reviewed 
up the chain of command.201 On paper, this might seem like a reasonable 
mechanism to ensure that complaints are investigated thoroughly and 
fairly.202 But in Chicago, careful review of agency files made clear that in 
practice, the requirement “create[d] needless opportunity to undermine 
accountability” and let officers off the hook.203 This sort of information 
typically would not accompany a request for public comment. But without 
that information, it is much harder for the public to assess whether the rule 
is a good one. 
The more complex an area of policy, the harder it is to envision ordinary 
residents and their elected representatives playing a meaningful role in 
driving policy change—at least not without substantial help. The information 
asymmetry discussed above is a problem even for experts, such as lawyers, 
technologists, or former police personnel. This problem is greater still if the 
goal of rulemaking-type procedures is to empower the broader public to 
weigh in. In Cleveland, the federal monitoring team spent months preparing 
videos, fact sheets, and discussion guides in order to facilitate informed 
discussion on the core aspects of the department’s proposed new use of force 
 
 200 In New Orleans, for example, the DOJ estimated that officers reported less than a quarter of all 
use of force incidents—and maybe as few as one in ten. NEW ORLEANS DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 
14. In Cleveland, “inadequate reports and investigations were approved all the way up the chain of 
command.” CLEVELAND DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 33. In Baltimore, interviews with officers 
involved in deadly force incidents often lasted no more than “ten or fifteen minutes, with some ending 
after five minutes.” BALTIMORE DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 108. 
 201 CHICAGO DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 82. 
 202 After all, commanders also are required to review use of force reports—and their failure to do so 
thoroughly has been cited in Justice Department investigations as a factor that contributes to excessive 
force. See, e.g., id. at 44–45. 
 203 Id. at 82. 
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policy.204 And of course these materials themselves were based on the results 
of a lengthy justice department investigation and a months-long policy 
revision process.205 Armed with this information, community members 
provided valuable comments on certain aspects of the policy, particularly 
around de-escalation and dealing with youth.206 Even still, the public 
discussion touched on a fraction of the changes that ultimately were made as 
part of the court-ordered reforms.207 It is hard to imagine that any of this 
would have happened had the Cleveland Division of Police simply been 
required to obtain public input on proposed changes to department rules. 
Although the focus of this Section has been primarily on the use of 
force, similar concerns apply to a variety of policing matters. Residents may 
be able to observe that officers are slow to respond when called or that crimes 
routinely go unsolved. But from the outside it is much harder to assess why 
that is happening—or to know whether a proposed change to a department 
policy is likely to make the problem better or worse (or if it is even germane). 
In New Orleans, for example, the Justice Department found that a key 
contributing factor to the poor quality of police services was the 
department’s lax secondary employment policy, which skewed the 
distribution of policing resources across neighborhoods and altered officer 
incentives in pernicious ways.208 On its face, however, a “secondary 
employment” or “paid detail” policy is unlikely to be one that the public 
would recognize as a core area of concern.209 Indeed, as Professor Seth 
 
 204 Motion Recommending Approval of Revised Use of Force Policies of the Cleveland Division of 
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 205 CLEVELAND DOJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 9–12; see Motion Recommending Approval of 
Revised Use of Force Policies of the Cleveland Division of Police at Exhibit G, United States v. 
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Finch, N.O. Cop, Acquitted of Fraud, Returns to Work, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 12, 2003, at 1; Brendan 
McCarthy, Cops Accused of Fraud, Again, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 24, 2009, at A1; Brendan McCarthy, 
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Stoughton points out, even policing scholars had given the matter little 
heed.210 
Finally, even if one could design a rulemaking process that reduced 
police policymaking down to the sorts of digestible questions with which this 
Section began, there still would be a real concern about participation fatigue. 
If police were to engage in rulemaking around all of the issues that 
proponents have pointed to—from the enforcement of noise ordinances and 
bicycle regulations, to new technologies and tactics, to use of force training 
and officer discipline—how often would the public be asked to weigh in? 
And to what extent would those who are able to participate regularly 
represent the views of the broader public affected by the decisions made? 
This last concern dovetails with the various line-drawing questions raised 
earlier in this Part. The broader the scope of a proposed rulemaking regime, 
the more difficult it is to make rulemaking accessible to members of the 
public who are most heavily impacted by policing rules. The narrower its 
reach, the less likely it is that the rules that are brought up for public debate 
will actually end up changing the practices that the public finds most 
troubling. 
 
*          *          * 
 
Although there are many reasons why we might want policing agencies 
to adopt rules with some opportunity for public input, there are serious 
reasons to doubt that rulemaking is a viable strategy for governing policing 
across a variety of policy domains. Certain kinds of policing decisions—
particularly around new surveillance technologies—may fit reasonably well 
within the traditional rulemaking paradigm. But many others, for one reason 
or another, will not. For enforcement discretion, the primary obstacle is that 
policing agencies have few incentives to adopt guidelines and rules, and it 
may not be possible to adopt a workable standard that requires them to do 
so. For use of force, the concern is quite different: given the many policies 
that influence use of force outcomes and the difficulty of assessing 
shortcomings from the outside, rulemaking-type procedures may not be the 
best mechanism for driving policy change or for giving voice to those who 
are most affected by what police do. To be clear, even in these contexts, 
rulemaking undoubtedly has some role to play. But it is unlikely, on its own, 
to bring about sufficient change. 
 
 210 Seth W. Stoughton, Moonlighting: The Private Employment of Off-Duty Officers, 2017 U. ILL. L. 
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III. GOVERNING POLICING THROUGH AGENCY DESIGN 
Although Part II sets out good reasons to doubt whether public 
rulemaking can fix policing, it also underscores that the problem of policing 
is, fundamentally, a problem of governance. The fact that policing agencies 
lack the incentive to adopt the sorts of rules that would make policing less 
harmful and more effective is an obstacle to rulemaking—but it also is a 
problem that itself needs to be solved. Similarly, although it may be 
unrealistic to expect the public to get into the nitty-gritty of police systems 
and rules, it remains true that police department policies incorporate 
important value judgments that should not be left for police officials to 
resolve on their own. If rulemaking is not the right model for addressing the 
governance shortfall, that shortfall must be addressed in some other way. 
This Part offers a preliminary sketch of what a more comprehensive set 
of reforms might entail. It first argues that the various problems with 
rulemaking identified in Part II point strongly in favor of creating external 
regulatory structures to help govern the police, such as police commissions 
or inspectors general. These entities, which I call “regulatory 
intermediaries,” could help shift the incentive structure that discourages 
police rulemaking, provide more systemic oversight over police policies and 
practices, and even facilitate broader public input and debate. 
Of course, with 18,000 police departments, these sorts of regulatory 
structures may not be a viable solution to the problems of policing writ large. 
And in particular, they may not work outside of larger jurisdictions. For this 
reason, this Part concludes by suggesting that states could play a greater role 
in governing local policing, both by regulating certain practices directly and 
by mandating data collection that could reinforce existing local political 
controls. 
A. Regulatory Intermediaries 
Although policing scholars have largely equated administrative law 
with notice-and-comment rulemaking, a growing number of administrative 
law scholars have begun to look past rulemaking and focus more broadly on 
questions of institutional design. Importantly, they have done so in response 
to problems that look a lot like the sorts of problems that plague policing, 
including enforcement discretion, internal compliance, resource allocation, 
and the like.211 
One of the core insights of the agency design literature is that 
sometimes the agency itself needs a regulator—to improve the quality of 
agency deliberations, to facilitate greater internal and external 
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accountability, or to ensure that agencies give certain values greater 
weight.212 Agency regulators, or what this Article calls “regulatory 
intermediaries,” can further these goals in a number of ways. They can 
generate information about agency practices in order to make those practices 
more transparent to elected officials and the public at large.213 They can serve 
as a point of contact for groups that typically would not have pull with 
agency staff.214 They can advocate directly for certain values that otherwise 
might be ignored.215 And they can help tackle problems that might not be 
amenable to being governed through ex ante policies or rules.216 
Across executive government, “regulatory intermediaries” take on a 
variety of forms. Dozens of federal agencies, including the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the Department of Justice, have inspectors general 
who review agency policies and practices and make recommendations about 
changes that ought to be made.217 A number of other agencies have offices 
within the agency created specifically to advocate for certain values or 
norms.218 Independent agencies typically are governed by multimember 
boards and commissions, which, as Professor Barkow notes, creates a “built-
in monitoring system for interests on both sides” that can help to ensure that 
agency decisions accommodate a more diverse range of views.219 Sister 
agencies sometimes also are authorized to regulate each other. For example, 
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a number of statutes require federal agencies to consult with either the EPA 
or the Fish and Wildlife Service before undertaking certain actions that could 
impact the environment.220 Indeed, as Professor Neal Katyal points out, 
legislatures often are more willing to create these sorts of regulatory 
structures than they are to make tough policy choices themselves.221 
These regulatory structures exist at the local level as well. School 
superintendents typically answer to elected or appointed boards, as do many 
other local agencies, including health departments and zoning 
administrations.222 Cities also rely on a variety of structures to hold agencies 
accountable, including inspectors general, ombudsmen, and public 
advocates.223 In New York City alone, several dozen municipal agencies have 
dedicated inspectors general with varying degrees of authority over agency 
affairs.224 
Although regulatory intermediaries also exist around policing, they are 
comparatively rare.225 A handful of police departments in major cities, 
including Detroit, Milwaukee, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, are governed 
(more or less) by civilian police commissions with final authority to set 
policy for the police.226 A larger number of other departments have police 
auditors or inspectors general who have authority to review department 
policies and practices and recommend policy changes.227 Far more common 
around policing are Civilian Review Boards, which either investigate 
allegations of police misconduct or review completed investigations after the 
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fact.228 But these “back-end” bodies, which focus almost exclusively on 
individual instances of misconduct, have done little to address the broader 
governance shortfall around how police decisions are made.229 
This is beginning to change. In recent years, a number of major cities—
including Seattle, Chicago, and New York—have created powerful new 
offices of the Inspector General to oversee their police departments.230 Seattle 
also created a permanent Community Police Commission to work alongside 
the Inspector General to review police department policies and practices and 
make recommendations.231 Several other cities are considering proposals to 
do the same.232 
The problem, as others have pointed out, is that in setting up these new 
structures, jurisdictions must resolve a number of difficult questions without 
much guidance.233 What powers, for example, should a regulatory 
intermediary have? Is it essential for the entity to have power to set policy, 
or is it sufficient (or even preferable) for the body to make recommendations 
without having the final say? Should police departments, like schools, be 
governed by multi-member commissions, or would it be better to set up more 
streamlined structures to strengthen existing political controls? Should the 
 
 228 See Police Oversight by Jurisdiction (USA), NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT 
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, https://www.nacole.org/police_oversight_by_jurisdiction_usa 
[https://perma.cc/85AL-9YTW] (listing cities with civilian oversight entities, most of which are CRBs); 
Martin Kaste, Police Are Learning To Accept Civilian Oversight, But Distrust Lingers, NPR (Feb. 21, 
2015, 10:18 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/02/21/387770044/police-are-learning-to-accept-civilian-
oversight-but-distrust-lingers [https://perma.cc/3GDQ-FJ77] (noting that there are more than 200 such 
entities). 
 229 See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 10, at 1877 (distinguishing between “front-end” and 
“back-end” accountability); Debra Livingston, The Unfulfilled Promise of Citizen Review, 1 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 653, 661 (2003) (noting the limits of CRBs, including that CRBs tend to focus too heavily on 
“rule enforcement” as opposed to more systematic review); Miller, supra note 11, at 547 (drawing a 
similar distinction); Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437, 466–
67 (2016) (noting the limited success of such bodies). 
 230 New York City created the Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD in 2014. N.Y.C., N.Y., 
LOCAL LAW, NO. 70 (2013), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doi/oignypd/local-law/Local-Law-70.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W5KT-BL5S]. Chicago revamped its regulatory structure, adding a Deputy Inspector 
General for Public Safety, in 2016. CHI., IL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2–56–205 (2016). Seattle created an 
Office of Inspector General for Public Safety in 2017, SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 125315 (2017). 
 231 SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 125315 (2017). 
 232 See, e.g., Sarah Schulte, Group Proposes Civilian Commission to Oversee Chicago Police, ABC 
7: CHI. (Mar. 13, 2018), https://abc7chicago.com/group-proposes-civilian-commission-to-oversee-
chicago-police/3211657 [https://perma.cc/DZ85-QZMV]. 
 233 See, e.g., DE ANGELIS, supra note 227, at 10–12 (2016) (noting the dearth of research on the 
effectiveness of civilian oversight); Jessica Lee, Many Questions, Few Answers, MINNEAPOLIS POST 
(Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2018/08/many-questions-few-answers-
minneapolis-council-takes-proposal-change-police [https://perma.cc/2ERZ-6RKY] (lamenting the fact 
that “very little research exists on the effectiveness of distributing the power of police departments among 
multiple arms of government”). 
114:1 (2019) Rethinking Police Rulemaking 
49 
regulatory body review policing policies and practices from a distance, or 
should staff members be more integrated into the department structure so as 
to weigh in on decisions as they come up? 
Over the years, a number of scholars have urged greater attention to 
these sorts of questions—but with the exception of some important work by 
Professors Samuel Walker and Joanna Schwartz, there have been few 
attempts to answer them.234 Notably lacking is a clear theory on precisely 
what is missing around policing governance—and by extension, the 
institutional structures that are necessary to effectively govern the police.235 
The remainder of this Section sets out a preliminary framework for 
resolving these questions, which follows naturally both from the problems 
with policing and the obstacles to rulemaking identified in Parts I and II. 
1. Information 
One of the main obstacles to public rulemaking—and to public 
oversight of policing more generally—is the difficulty of identifying 
shortfalls in department practices by relying solely on the text of department 
rules.236 Given the systemic character of many policing outcomes, a 
regulatory intermediary must have the authority to review police department 
records and conduct the sorts of top-to-bottom investigations that are 
necessary to identify where the problems are, and the changes that should be 
made to address them. 
In short, some sort of auditing function is essential—the ability to 
review agency records, speak with department officials, and figure out where 
things are going wrong and why. Generating this sort of information would 
serve two important functions. It would improve the quality of the regulatory 
intermediary’s own policy recommendations. And just as importantly, it 
would help facilitate more informed public debate around policing by 
making the problems of policing more transparent to elected officials and to 
the public at large. 
Yet this is precisely the function that often is lacking among existing 
police oversight models. As discussed above, civilian review boards focus 
 
 234 See WALKER, supra note 225 (discussing various institutional controls); Rachel A. Harmon, The 
Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 764 (2012) (urging greater attention to institutions that can 
help effectively regulate the police); Schwartz, supra note 229, at 438 (noting that the question of “who 
is best situated to advance [police] reforms . . . has received less attention” and suggesting a preliminary 
framework for analyzing the strength of various entities both in and out of government); David Alan 
Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1802 (2005) (arguing for more scholarly 
attention to “institutional mechanisms traditionally relied upon for democratic control of the police—city 
councils, mayors’ offices, and, more recently, civilian oversight agencies.”). 
 235  Harmon,  supra note 234, at 764; Sklansky, supra note 234, at 1802. 
 236 See supra Section II.D. 
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almost exclusively on individual instances of misconduct—and although 
they sometimes have the authority to make broader policy recommendations, 
they rarely are in a position to generate the information necessary to exercise 
it effectively. Many review boards are made up entirely of unpaid volunteers, 
without a professional staff and without unfettered access to department 
files. The same often is true of police commissions, including commissions 
with formal authority to set policy for the department and hire or fire the 
chief of police.237 Without this authority and capacity, however, these boards 
are only marginally better off than the general public or elected officials in 
regulating the police. 
2. Incentives 
Much of Part II focused on problem of incentives—and in particular, 
the lack of incentive on the part of policing agencies to adopt the sorts of 
policies and practices that could make policing more equitable and reduce 
some of its collateral costs. The problem is hardly unique to policing 
agencies: as Professor Margo Schlanger notes, “[i]nducing governmental 
organizations to do the right thing is the central problem of public 
administration,” particularly “when ‘the right thing’ means executing not 
only a primary mission but also constraints on that mission.”238 The Forest 
Service, for example, has at times privileged timber production over the 
competing goal of conservation.239 The Department of Housing and Urban 
Development has at times promoted new housing construction while 
downplaying environmental concerns.240 In the policing context, the 
challenge has been to ensure that policing agencies pursue their law 
enforcement mission in a manner that respects constitutional rights, 
minimizes undue intrusions on liberty and privacy, and complies with 
equality norms. 
 
 237 See, e.g., RICHARD JEROME, POLICE ASSESSMENT RESOURCE CTR., PROMOTING POLICE 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN MILWAUKEE: STRENGTHENING THE FIRE AND POLICE COMMISSION 1–5 (2006) 
(noting that despite its wide-ranging formal powers, the commission has been rightly perceived to be 
“weak and ineffective” due in large part to the lack of an independent monitor or auditor with the staff 
necessary to conduct thorough policy reviews); REPORT OF THE RAMPART INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL 
4–6 (2000) (finding that “[h]istorically, the Commission has not exercised the degree of control over the 
Department that one would expect given the Charter’s broad grant of power to the Commission” because 
it lacked the capacity to undertake systematic review of department policies and practices). 
 238 Schlanger, supra note 26, at 54; see also JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 371 (1989) (noting that “those tasks that are not part 
of the core mission will need special protection”). 
 239 Barkow, supra note 219, at 50. 
 240 See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1301 (2006) (“HUD zealously pursued its housing goals while giving short 
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Regulatory intermediaries could help address the incentives problem in 
two ways. First, an entity that sits at some remove from a police department 
and yet is charged specifically with regulating its policies and practices will 
likely have the incentive to supervise policing practices in ways that the 
department itself does not.241 Individuals who step into an oversight role 
typically come from different professional backgrounds than do law 
enforcement professionals.242 These individuals may feel themselves 
beholden to a different political constituency and thus be more sympathetic 
to certain values than either mayors or chiefs.243 In New York, for example, 
the NYPD’s Inspector General has focused on a number of policy issues on 
which police self-governance has typically fallen short, including 
surveillance of political protests, overenforcement of quality of life offenses, 
and the handling of civilian complaints.244 In Chicago, the newly appointed 
Deputy Inspector General for Public Safety promised to begin his task by 
evaluating the department’s policies and practices around secondary 
employment, gang databases, and the use of school resource officers, among 
others.245 
Second, by generating information about existing policy shortfalls, a 
regulatory intermediary could help nudge policing agencies to address 
problems that they otherwise might ignore. They can alert senior department 
officials to problems that they simply were not aware of. And they can 
generate information that advocates and plaintiffs can then use to push for 
change. In 2018, for example, the NYPD Inspector General issued a scathing 
report regarding the NYPD’s mishandling and underenforcement of sexual 
 
 241 Katyal, supra note 25, at 2324 (noting that “[w]here you stand is a function of where you sit”). 
 242 The NYPD Inspector General Philip K. Eure, for example, spent a decade at the Civil Rights 
Division within the Department of Justice, and then another fourteen years as the head of the civilian 
complaints bureau in Washington, D.C. See Inspector General’s Biography, DEP’T OF INVESTIGATION, 
N.Y.C., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/oignypd/about/biography.page [https://perma.cc/RF3W-A4B2]. 
 243 Schlanger, supra note 26, at 109 (noting that the “natural opponents” of an agency may be the 
“natural constituents” of an “Office of Goodness”). 
 244 For a list of reports issued by the NYPD OIG, see IG-NYPD Reports, OFF. INSPECTOR GEN. 
NYPD, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/oignypd/reports/reports.page [https://perma.cc/MHB5-389Z]. 
 245 Press Release, Office of Inspector Gen., City of Chicago Office of the Deputy Inspector General 
for Public Safety Releases Initiated Projects List (Mar. 22, 2018), http://chicagoinspectorgeneral.org/ 
publications-and-press/press-releases/city-of-chicago-office-of-the-deputy-inspector-general-for-public-
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assault cases.246 Although the NYPD initially pushed back against the 
findings, it ultimately made a number of changes in response.247 
Importantly, regulatory intermediaries could help address the incentives 
problem while sidestepping some of the difficulties inherent in mandatory 
rulemaking regimes. In particular, relying on a regulatory intermediary 
avoids the difficulty of having to specify in advance which policies and 
practices must be subject to rules or public input.248 A regulatory 
intermediary can review department policies, records, data, and complaints 
to identify areas in which rules are lacking or flag policy questions on which 
the public ought to weigh in. Instead of looking to the legislature to specify 
every possible policing practice that could benefit from having more or better 
rules, one could look to a regulatory intermediary to assess, on an ongoing 
basis, which practices in fact would. 
The problem, of course, is that regulatory intermediaries are likely to 
face incentives problems of their own—or they simply may be unable to alter 
the existing incentives structure enough to effect meaningful change. Indeed, 
one of the biggest challenges in policing governance is the fact that policing 
has been as much a problem of democracy as it has been a problem of its 
absence. Policing often looks the way that it does because those who have 
the greatest stake in bringing abusive or intrusive practices under control 
often are the least organized politically to push for change.249 Designing a 
regulatory framework around policing that operates within the existing 
political structure—while standing sufficiently apart to avoid the political 
pathologies around police decisionmaking—is no easy task. 
Three design choices touch directly on the problem of incentives—but 
here, the answers are less clear-cut than they are with respect to the 
information-generating function that a regulatory intermediary must play. 
The first question is whether a regulatory intermediary ought to be able 
to mandate specific policy changes, or simply issue recommendations as to 
the changes that ought to be made. A small number of police commissions 
have final policymaking authority.250 Other commissions are purely 
 
 246 MARK G. PETERS, COMMISSIONER, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF INVESTIGATION’S INSPECTOR GEN. FOR 
NYPD, AN INVESTIGATION OF NYPD’S SPECIAL VICTIMS DIVISION—ADULT SEX CRIMES (2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doi/reports/pdf/2018/Mar/SVDReport_32718.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/VLA7-PGQ5]. 
 247 Myles Miller, Shakeup of the NYPD’s Special Victims Division After Scathing Report, NY1.COM 
(Nov. 19, 2018, 10:10 AM), https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2018/11/16/shakeup-of-the-
nypd-s-special-victims-division-after-scathing-report [https://perma.cc/L9JE-696G]. 
 248 Cf. supra Section II.C (discussing the challenges of deciding what constitutes a policy or rule 
requiring public input in the first place). 
 249 See generally Dripps, supra note 141. 
 250 See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
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advisory.251 Inspectors general (IGs) are authorized only to recommend 
changes and track compliance—though in Los Angeles, the IG reports to a 
Police Commission, which does in fact have the authority to insist on policy 
change.252 The question is whether the authority to make recommendations, 
without the authority to implement them, is enough to prompt meaningful 
change. 
As discussed above, even purely advisory bodies can prompt 
policymaking in a variety of ways—by making problems more difficult to 
ignore and by arming advocates with the information they need in order to 
push for change. The NYPD, for example, has implemented or partially 
implemented more than half of the recommendations made by the IG in its 
first three years, including important changes to use of force policies and 
training.253 Yet the recommendations that the NYPD has rejected—
particularly around the disproportionate racial impact of quality of life 
enforcement—are perhaps indicative of the limits of this model.254 At the 
federal level, inspectors general often have been ignored when they raise 
issues involving matters about which legislators have decided not to care.255 
At the same time, there are reasons to doubt whether the power to 
mandate policy is preferable. Professor Barkow points out, for example, that 
state sentencing commissions without final policymaking authority have 
sometimes been more effective than their more powerful counterparts in 
other states.256 Some of the most successful sentencing commissions are ones 
that operate “as interest group[s] for rational sentencing policy” and not as 
independent experts who set policy themselves.257 Much of this has to do 
with the fact that legislatures tend to be quite active around sentencing issues 
and as a result have tended to override sentencing commission decisions with 
which they disagree.258 Although legislatures have traditionally been much 
less active in the policing space, there still are reasons to think that 
policymaking bodies could face an uphill battle in the policing context as 
well. First, given the stakes involved in appointing individuals to policy-
setting bodies and the political strength of police unions in many 
jurisdictions, mayors and city council members may face pressure to appoint 
 
 251 See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 125315 (2017). 
 252 L.A., CAL., CHARTER art. V, § 571(4) (2017). 
 253 N.Y.C. DEP’T OF INVESTIGATION, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE NYPD, THIRD 
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individuals who are less likely to upend the status quo. Commissioners 
themselves may be reluctant to routinely impose policy on the department 
by fiat. And as Part II makes clear, police officials up and down the chain of 
command have lots of mechanisms at their disposal to thwart policy changes 
with which they disagree. This is an area where more research is needed to 
better understand how both advisory and policy-setting bodies have fared. 
Another important question is whether a regulatory intermediary should 
be entirely independent from the police department or whether it should be 
integrated into the agency in some way. One of the concerns with regulatory 
intermediaries throughout government is that they may become “coopted” or 
“captured” by the entity that they are tasked with regulating—and thus 
become less likely to push for change.259 As Professor Herbert Simon 
observed, “[o]ne does not live for months or years in a particular position in 
an organization, exposed to some streams of communication, shielded from 
others, without the most profound effects on what one knows, believes, . . . 
and proposes.”260 Individuals who come into the position with one set of 
views may find that over time their views substantially evolve.261 For this 
reason, many have argued in favor of creating regulatory bodies that are 
entirely independent of the agencies that they are expected to regulate. 
At the same time, too much distance between the regulator and the 
regulated can deprive the former of valuable information and potentially 
reduce its persuasive authority. It also may limit the sorts of decisions on 
which a regulatory intermediary could weigh in—and by extension, its 
ability to effect systemic change. Professor Schlanger notes, for example, 
that one of the advantages of situating a regulatory intermediary within an 
agency is that officials are able to sit in on meetings and potentially influence 
agency decisions on an ongoing basis.262 Given the fluid nature of police 
decisionmaking, certain policy choices may be difficult to discern from 
agency records after the fact. This is another area in which more research is 
necessary to know which is likely to be the greater concern. 
Finally, a third set of questions concerns the manner in which regulatory 
intermediaries are chosen. The appointments process tends to be the point at 
which abstract questions of institutional design run into the messy reality of 
politics. A police commission with all of the resources and authority in the 
world may still accomplish nothing if the mayor appoints political cronies 
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who have little interest in actually governing the police.263 Elected boards—
chosen in low-visibility local elections with a powerful police union 
presence—may not fare any better.264 There are, in short, no easy answers. 
And some options may be precluded by municipal structure or local custom. 
Still, it is possible to at least sketch out what the various considerations might 
be. 
To start, the range of viable options likely is quite a bit narrower for IGs 
than it is for commissions or boards. Inspectors general almost universally 
are appointed.265 Indeed, one of the key features of an inspector general 
model is thought to be their removal from ordinary politics.266 
For local commissions and boards, on the other hand, there are fewer 
constraints on the manner in which members are chosen. The arguments both 
for and against elected boards in local government are familiar—though 
much of the debate has taken place in the context of governing public 
schools. The argument in favor of elections is that they are more 
“democratic” and give voters an opportunity to hold officials accountable for 
outcomes within a specific policy domain.267 On the other hand, turnout in 
municipal elections tends to be low to begin with, and many voters do not 
pick candidates in down-ballot races at all.268 Some have expressed concern 
that elections tend to attract candidates who may see the position as a 
stepping-stone to higher political office and may lack the qualifications or 
commitment necessary to do the work.269 Finally, there are serious concerns 
about union influence—perhaps more so in the policing context given the 
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degree of divergence between the policy preferences of police union leaders 
and the concerns of residents in heavily policed communities. 
Although there are problems with appointments as well—including 
some of the same concerns about political ambition and union influence—
there may be a variety of strategies for structuring appointment processes in 
a way that can mitigate them to some degree. In both Chicago and New York, 
for example, the police IG is appointed by a citywide inspector general who 
is at some remove from city politics and may have a different set of 
professional and reputational interests at stake in picking a credible 
candidate.270 Merit selection panels that include a variety of stakeholder 
representatives are another possible choice.271 Even political appointments 
can be structured at least to some extent—for example, by requiring a 
commission to include individuals with particular professional backgrounds, 
such as a public defender or someone from the mental health community.272 
Ultimately, more research is needed to assess the effectiveness of 
various models. Still, focusing squarely on the problem of incentives at the 
very least makes clear the questions that must be resolved—and the potential 
tradeoffs involved. 
3. Legitimacy and Representation 
Finally, part of what drove rulemaking proponents was the recognition 
that police policymaking is shot through with value judgments that should 
not be left to the police to resolve on their own. The same critique, however, 
could be leveled at a regulatory intermediary as well—particularly if the 
entity is insulated from the affected communities whose interests it is 
supposed to represent. What this means is that a regulatory body must either 
be vested with some degree of representative legitimacy to speak for the 
broader public, or it must have mechanisms to hear from various 
stakeholders on a regular basis. 
 
 270 See CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2-56-220 (2016) (providing for a police IG who is an “attorney 
with substantial experience in criminal, civil rights, and/or labor law, or corporate and/or governmental 
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This last consideration has a number of important implications for how 
a regulatory intermediary is structured and staffed. One way that a regulatory 
entity can incorporate a broader range of perspectives is by including various 
community stakeholders in its policymaking process. The San Francisco 
Police Commission, for example, convened a working group of community 
members and police officials to revise the department’s policy on 
immigration enforcement.273 Similarly, in preparing its report on officer 
interactions with people in mental crisis, the NYPD Inspector General’s 
office “interviewed advocates from mental health organizations and attended 
public forums to hear perspectives of people living with mental 
illness . . . .”274 Other entities at both the federal and local level have played 
a similar function.275 
There are, however, a number of limitations to this approach. One 
concern is that it puts the onus on the agency itself to identify both the issues 
that would benefit from public input and the perspectives that ought to be 
heard. Another is that this sort of engagement requires staff capacity that 
existing entities often lack. Although the larger inspectors general offices in 
cities like Los Angeles and New York have dedicated outreach workers to 
ensure close collaboration with various stakeholders, auditors or IGs in 
smaller jurisdictions may have few, if any, staff members at all.276 If the goal 
is to rely on regulatory intermediaries to facilitate public input in police 
decisionmaking, they must be staffed accordingly to ensure that this occurs. 
Another way to ensure some degree of representative legitimacy is to 
create a multi-member board or commission to work in tandem with an 
auditor or IG. In Los Angeles, for example, there is both an IG and a civilian 
Police Commission. The latter acts as a “board of directors” for the police 
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department and also directs the IG’s efforts.277 Seattle has an IG as well as an 
advisory Community Police Commission, which can recommend specific 
policy issues for the Inspector General to pursue.278 This approach is not 
unique to policing. Throughout government, we often look to representative 
bodies to stand in for the public in making the many decisions that must be 
made without the benefit of a referendum or a wide-ranging public debate. 
The degree to which any board or commission can perform that function 
depends, of course, on how its members are appointed. In Seattle, 
commissioners are required by law to reflect a balance of perspectives and 
views—including individuals who either come from or work directly with 
communities that traditionally have been heavily impacted by the police.279 
In Los Angeles, however, the Police Commission has traditionally not been 
“representative” in the same way. As of 2019, its five-member board 
included a business leader, a developer, a law professor, a foundation 
president, and the head of a local nonprofit (the latter two both represent 
organizations that provide direct services to various impacted communities, 
including the homeless or LGBT youth).280 Although a multi-member 
commission may still lend greater legitimacy to police decisionmaking than 
a chief of police or a stand-alone IG, a commission that is structured along 
the lines of the Los Angeles model may not be able to rely on its 
“representative” legitimacy alone. 
Finally, commissions are not the only government bodies that can 
represent the broader public in regulating the police. Some jurisdictions, for 
example, have experimented with vesting greater authority in city councils, 
either over particular policy issues or over the department as a whole.281 And 
sometimes, city councils have created their own advisory groups to help 
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inform these decisions.282 These sorts of models may be worth exploring as 
well. 
 
*          *          * 
 
Ultimately, more research clearly is needed to provide jurisdictions 
with concrete guidance about the regulatory models that are most likely to 
work. What the preceding Section suggests, however, is that in assessing 
these models, researchers should focus on the degree to which existing 
regulatory bodies are able to further three specific goals: (1) generating 
information about potential shortfalls in department policies and practices; 
(2) creating the incentives necessary for police departments to address them; 
and (3) ensuring that key policy decisions are informed by the views of the 
various stakeholders who are likely to be impacted by the choices made. 
B. Rethinking Local Governance of the Police 
Although regulatory intermediaries can play an important role in police 
governance, they are at best a solution to the problems of urban—and 
perhaps suburban—policing. It simply may not be feasible for smaller 
municipalities to set up elaborate governance structures. Even if it were, it is 
not clear that 18,000 police commissions necessarily should join some 
14,000 school boards in the distinctly American experiment in hyper-
localized participatory government. Yet the problems of policing are hardly 
confined to major cities. Ferguson, after all, has a population of just over 
20,000.283 And as Professor Monica Bell points out, poor rural communities 
may be particularly vulnerable to abusive policing.284 
This suggests that in addition to making local police governance more 
effective, it is worth asking to what extent police decisions should be made 
locally at all.285 To be sure, so long as policing remains primarily a local 
 
 282 See, e.g., Privacy Advisory Commission, CITY OF OAKLAND, http://www2. 
oaklandnet.com/government/o/CityAdministration/d/PrivacyAdvisoryCommission/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/T4BW-DFZ8]. 
 283 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 6 (2015). 
 284 See Bell, supra note 54, at 2136–37 (noting that “[t]he proliferation of many small police 
departments means that some neighborhoods can essentially become individual fiefdoms for certain 
officers,” and that “[s]mall departments can also create various interjurisdictional inconsistencies ranging 
from the amount of training officers receive to the equipment available to keep themselves and civilians 
safe”). 
 285 Professor William Stuntz has at times suggested that states ought to play a greater role, though 
his perspective on the issue has tended to shift over the years. Compare William J. Stuntz, Accountable 
Policing 8–11 (Harv. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 130, 2006) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 886170 [https://perma.cc/WNJ3-UTGY] (arguing in favor of greater state and 
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function, day-to-day decisions will continue to be made by local officials. 
But there are many decisions—concerning police policies, training 
requirements, data collection, and monitoring—that could be made at the 
state level. The federal government also could play a greater role, though 
federalism principles impose some constraints on what that role might be. 
Both the federal government and the states already play some role in 
regulating local policing. The Constitution imposes national constraints on 
the manner in which officers exercise their authority to conduct searches and 
seizures and interrogate suspects.286 Federal statutes regulate certain aspects 
of policing, particularly around surveillance and digital privacy.287 The 
Department of Justice has investigated several dozen departments accused 
of engaging in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, and in a 
subset of these investigations, has negotiated consent decrees mandating 
wide-ranging reforms. But as a number of scholars have pointed out, the 
Justice Department’s resources are limited, and federal legislation is limited 
in scope and often badly out of date.288 
States tend to be more active in the policing space. Legislatures in a 
number of states have passed laws regulating drones and other surveillance 
technologies, mandating the collection of traffic stop data, and governing 
practices such as strip searches and custodial interrogations.289 Every state 
has a commission on Police Officer Standards and Training (POST), which 
establishes the requirements for becoming a police officer and sets minimum 
standards for police training.290 The vast majority of state POSTs also have 
authority to strip officers of their law enforcement powers (called 
“decertification”) upon conviction for certain crimes, and in some states, 
based on a finding of serious misconduct.291 
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In other areas of government beyond policing, however, statewide 
entities, including legislatures and state-level agencies, play a much more 
expansive role. Although schools are run locally, state boards of education 
adopt curricular standards, graduation requirements, and performance 
metrics.292 In Texas, the state Commissioner for Education has the authority 
to bring a local school district under the control of an independent monitor 
if it fails to meet certain standards over a period of years.293 Most cities or 
counties likewise have their own social service agencies, but state 
departments set minimum standards for childcare facilities, foster care 
placements, and benefits determinations.294 
In policing, too, states could do quite a bit more. State POSTs, for 
example, could be authorized to set minimum standards not only for training 
but also for substantive agency policies. The New Jersey Attorney General 
already has this authority and has adopted minimum standards on a variety 
of issues, including early warning systems, vehicle pursuits, less lethal 
weapons, and body-worn cameras.295 Many of these policies go well beyond 
the minimum requirements of constitutional law or even model policies 
adopted by law enforcement groups like the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police.296 
To address more systemic failings—for example, around the use of 
force—states could set up audit bureaus to review policing practices in 
agencies that are too small to justify hiring a full-time inspector general. 
State attorneys general could augment the Justice Department’s efforts by 
investigating local patterns of unconstitutional misconduct, which some 
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already are authorized to do.297 States also could require local agencies to 
collect and publicize data about their enforcement practices, which could in 
turn strengthen existing local controls.298 
One concern, of course, is that state-level intervention may fall prey to 
some of the same concerns with rulemaking identified in Parts I and II. State 
rules and regulations, for example, are unlikely to address those aspects of 
policing that are not particularly amenable to being regulated through rules 
in the first place—such as the twin problems of over- and under-
enforcement. Similarly, one would expect state-level auditors to focus 
primarily on matters of legal compliance—as opposed to the sorts of 
discretionary policy choices that end up disproportionately harming certain 
marginalized groups. It is difficult to imagine, for example, a state-level audit 
delving into a local policing agency’s decisions around resource allocation 
or quality of life enforcement—both of which have been areas of interest for 
local IGs. 
Another obvious concern with state-level regulation of policing is that 
traditionally, states have not been particularly hospitable grounds for police 
reform.299 Police unions and other law enforcement organizations are a 
powerful force in state-level politics.300 And states have at times done more 
to hamper effective regulation than to encourage it—for example, by 
adopting law enforcement officer bills of rights (LEBORs) that impose 
various restrictions on internal police investigations and limit the data that 
can be made public.301 
Still, it is important to keep in mind that ordinary local politics has not 
been particularly conducive to effective regulation of policing either. The 
entire premise of Part III, consistent with much of the scholarship on agency 
design, is that it is possible to structure institutions in a way that mitigates 
these pathologies at least to some degree, and that legislatures may be more 
amenable to these structural changes than to legislating substantive reform. 
There are, of course, broader questions about whether state regulation would 
be preferable to the prevailing system of local control. The main point here 
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is that in addition to focusing on agency design at the local level, scholars 
also could turn greater attention to the states. 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this article has been two-fold: to highlight the many limits 
of rulemaking as a strategy for governing policing and, at the same time, to 
use those limits as a jumping off point to consider alternatives. Both the 
rulemaking moment of the 1960s and the rulemaking renaissance today were 
prompted by very real concerns both about the many problems of policing 
and the insufficiency of existing governance mechanisms to meaningfully 
address them. As Parts I and II made clear, there is a need for more and better 
rules around policing and also for greater transparency about the choices 
departments make and the effects they have. But we are unlikely to get there 
simply by extending APA-style rulemaking to local police. The problem, 
ultimately, is one of information and incentives—and until these two things 
change, rulemaking alone is likely to fall short, except around issues like 
police surveillance where the model does indeed seem to be a good fit. Part 
III proposed two possible changes to the status quo: regulatory 
intermediaries at the local level as well as greater state or federal control. 
The task going forward is to develop a much richer understanding of what it 
would take to make these alternatives work. 
  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
64 
 
